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Abstract 
My aim and purpose with this piece of research is to analyse the impact of recent 
‘Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play regulations’ issued by UEFA, in the structure of 
European sporting bodies. These regulations administrate the level of expenditure of 
European football clubs and, therefore, this work examines the framework of those rules, with 
particular emphasis given to the controversial ‘break-even’ prerequisite. We will also examine 
the European standards on the subject and whether the UEFA’s mechanism is compatible 
with the same. We will analyse the possibility that it comprises an anticompetitive agreement 
(art. 101 TFEU) and, in the event that it does, whether this is exempted and under what 
circumstances. Some related topics will also be addressed, such as the specificity of sport, the 
dissociation between pure sporting rules and economic rules, the alleged infringement of 
Articles 45 and 102 TFEU, as well as the problem of prohibition of the so-called third-party 
ownership of players. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: club licensing; financial fair play; break-even; salary cap; European 
competition law 
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Resumo 
O meu objetivo e propósito com esta dissertação é analisar o impacto das recentes 
regras de 'Licenciamento de Clubes e Fair Play Financeiro’ implementas pela UEFA, na 
estrutura das entidades desportivas europeias. Estes regulamentos administram o nível de 
despesa dos clubes europeus de futebol e, por isso, este trabalho avalia o âmbito dessas regras, 
com particular ênfase dado ao controverso pré-requisito do 'break-even'. Serão também 
aferidas as normas europeias nesta matéria e se o mecanismo da UEFA é compatível com as 
mesmas, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à probabilidade de constituir um acordo 
anticoncorrencial (art. 101 TFEU) e, nesse caso, se este está isento e em que circunstâncias. 
Algumas temáticas adjacentes serão também abordadas, tais como a especificidade do 
desporto, a dissociação entre regras puramente desportivas e regras económicas, a alegada 
violação dos artigos 45 e 102 do TFEU, bem como o problema da proibição da partilha de 
títulos por terceiros. 
 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: licenciamento de clubes; fair play financeiro; break-even; tecto 
salarial; direito Europeu da concorrência 
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Introduction 
It is a fact that, nowadays, European football is a big-money industry and that clubs 
are, more than ever, compared with profit seeking organisations. As a consequence of the 
clubs’ relentless pursuit of sporting success, which has been reflected in their finances, the 
majority of them are reporting excessive losses year after year or relying on their owners to 
cover their expenses by injecting equity in the club. In 2011, 38% of European clubs reported 
negative equity, while 15% per cent of them struggled with solvency issues during the same 
year.1 This scenario points to out the serious financial difficulties that European clubs are 
facing2, with potential bankruptcies still being considered within the UEFA football industry 
(he Scottish team Glasgow Rangers is an example).3 Due to the aforementioned reasons, the 
Union of European Football Associations decided to create a new legal instrument, the 
Financial Fair Play Regulations, in order to introduce some financial rationality into European 
football and to prevent clubs from carrying out with financial doping practices.  
The preexisting UEFA club licensing system is now updated, combining the previous 
rules with the FFP provisions, which stipulate that a club must not spend more than it earns. 
The new instrument, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations and Licensing System now sets 
out the financial requirements that a club must comply in order to get access into UEFA’s 
competitions. The core provision of the FFP regulations’ (updated version 2015) is the so-
called ‘break-even’ requirement - which I will analyse in this piece of research – that obliges, 
concisely, clubs not to spend beyond their means, not living above their possibilities. At first 
glance, one may say that these new rules introduced by UEFA may appear to be a mere 
quality standard. Yet, the provision highlighted above – break-even requirement – constitutes 
a sort of ‘salary cap in the sense that it limits the amount that a club is able to spend on a 
players’ salary.4 
This creates some serious problems since this salary cap mechanism constitutes, only 
per se, a restriction of competition. For this reason, we must assess whether this restriction 
                                                 
1
 The European Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year 2011, p.105. 
2
  Morrow, S., 2013. Football club financial reporting: “Time for a new model?” Sport, Business and Management: An International 
Journal, 3(4), pp.297–311. 
3
 Graham Spiers, “How the mighty Glasgow Rangers have fallen” (January 18, 2015), The Guardian, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jan/18/how-the-mighty-glasgow-rangers-have-fallen. 
4
  Flanagan, C.A. et al., 2013. “A tricky European fixture: an assessment of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations and their compatibility 
with EU law”, The International Sports Law Journal, 13(3), pp.137–148.  
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issued by UEFA violate, or not, the competition law of the European Union.  This research 
aims to answer exactly those questions raised around possible violations by UEFA’s 
regulations on the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union based on competition law 
grounds.  
Although the European Commission and the UEFA issued a joint statement on the 
matter, that was not enough to silence the most critical opinions. Recently, it was questioned 
whether a court – notably the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU) 
might strike it down and a complaint was filed.5 Perhaps, for that very reason, since 2015, 
UEFA decided how to perfect or ‘soften’ the rules of FFP so that clubs can attract more 
sustainable investment while they are controlling overspending.6  
In addition, some voices also raise the question of whether the FFP regulations breach 
European Union (hereinafter EU) law regarding the free movement of workers, in the sense 
that if a measure related to employment in professional sports within the EU block or 
discourage individuals from looking for another job in a different Member State, disregarding 
their nationality is in risk of violating article 48º of TFEU.7 My work will also consider and 
reflect about this legal issue. 
One should note that it is in the interest of all clubs in general is to take part in 
UEFA’s competitions, since the income that arises with them are one of the major sources of 
getting profits, throughout match day revenue, broadcasting revenue and commercial revenue 
(including merchandising)8. That is why CL&FFP rules are so important for them. 
                                                 
5
 Andrew Smith, “Financial Fair Play and the Striani Complaint: Where are we now?”, Law In Sports, (17 Feb. 2015) retrieved from: 
http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/financial-fair-play-and-the-striani-complaint-where-are-we-now. 
6
 Matt Slater, “Michel Platini: UEFA to ‘ease’ financial fair play rules” , BBC Sport, Football (18 May 2015), electronic available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/32784375. 
7
 Case C-415/93, URBSFA v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, §96; Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnaise v. Bernard & Newcastle Utd., 
judgement of 16 March 2010, §34. 
8
 Hampus Rikardsson & Linus Rikardsson (2013), “Strategic Management in Football – How the European top club could adjust to UEFA 
financial fair play and simultaneously create conditions for competitive advantage within the changing UEFA football industry”, Linköping 
University, Department of Management and Engineering, Business Administration, p.41. 
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Methodology 
A presentation of the CL&FFP regulations and the measures enshrined by UEFA will 
build the legal foundation of this master’s thesis research. The main purpose of the 
investigation is to scrutinise whether CL&FFP has an anti-competitive effect on the European 
football market regarding EU legislation. In order to achieve that, the legal-doctrinal method 
will be the most appropriate one to be used. The legal doctrine reproduces the normative 
complexity of the law. It proposes highly detailed and sophisticated evidence approaching 
how to deal with diverging arguments.9  
Specifically, it will address the main provisions enshrined in Article 101 (rules 
applying to undertakings) and 102 (abuse of dominant position) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and whether the FFP mechanism is in violation of it, by 
constituting an anticompetitive behaviour. Looking at the FFP consequences for clubs, 
players and different stakeholders with the EU regulations will constitute the basis for the 
legal analysis, highlighting the sports exceptions in the Commission’s White Paper on Sports, 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Some case law and principles derived from these will be 
important tools that will help understand some relevant issues in this research.  Cases such as 
Meca-Medina, Höfner, Dòna, Enic, Deliège, Associacion Téchnique Minière, Bosman, Piau, 
Viho and others have an important role in developing sports legislations with EU law.  
One of the most interesting points of this regulation is that it falls within the context of 
the sports universe and a pro-European and international dimension of sport. However, UEFA 
claims that sport and in particular football in this case does not function as said in "normal" 
businesses and that, therefore, should not be governed by European rules but by it, given the 
specific sport status and its special features. The European Commission also already intruded 
into the matter. For this reason or not, the fact is that the CJEU has already ruled several times 
in relation to exceptions and special status conferred on the UEFA. These materials will be an 
interesting starting point for reaching our response, regarding the impact of CL&FFP 
regulations in European football clubs and their compatibility with European Union law.  
                                                 
9
 Smits, J.M., 2015. “What is legal doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research”, Maastricht European Private Law 
Institute, Working paper nº 2015/06, p.16. 
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Part I. Financial Fair Play Rules and UEFA
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1. UEFA and the rationale behind Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play 
Regulations 
The Union of European Football Associations - UEFA - is the governing body of 
European football. It is an association of associations, a representative democracy10, and it is 
the umbrella organisation for 54 national football associations across Europe and one of the 
six continental federations of world football’s governing body – FIFA.11 Promoting the game 
and solidifying football’s status as the most popular sport in the world is perceived as its 
major imperative.12 It is an association entered in the register of companies under the Swiss 
common code, and is unbiased, politically and religiously. Its head office is situated in Nyon, 
Switzerland. It is a confederation of the upper world football governing body FIFA, which 
has its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland.  
The organs through which UEFA operates are the UEFA Congress, the UEFA Executive 
Committee, the UEFA President and the organs for the administration of justice. The UEFA 
Congress is UEFA's preeminent controlling organ. An Ordinary UEFA Congress is held each 
year, and is presented by delegates of UEFA's 54-member national associations. An 
extraordinary UEFA Congress might be met by the UEFA Executive Committee, or upon 
request of one fifth or more of the UEFA member associations, expressing the subjects to be 
addressed on the motivation. The Congress is subject to external auditors, an Auditing Body 
that shall be an auditing company, which is independent of UEFA, to fiscalize its accounts 
and to submit reports to the Congress.13 
The UEFA Executive Committee is UEFA's ‘supreme executive body’ and has total 
command in areas not attributed to the legal or statutory jurisdiction of the UEFA Congress.14 
The Executive Committee is also subject of evaluation, pursued by the governance and 
                                                 
10
 Each Member Association shall have one vote and a member Association may be represented at the Congress by a maximum of three 
delegates, as set in article 12º of Rules of Procedure of the UEFA Congress in UEFA Statutes, “Rules of Procedure of the UEFA Congress 
Regulations governing the Implementation of the UEFA Statutes”, (2014 Edition). 
11
 About UEFA, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.org/about-uefa/index.html (last updated July. 3, 2014). 
12
 UEFA, European football’s governing body, UEFA.com, available at: http://www.uefa.org./about-uefa/history/index.html (last updated 
July. 15, 2015). 
13
 See Article 46º of the UEFA Statutes, “Rules of Procedure of the UEFA Congress Regulations governing the Implementation of the UEFA 
Statutes”, (Edition 2014). 
14
 UEFA, Executive Comitte, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/executive-committee/index.html (last updated  Feb. 2, 
2016). 
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compliance auditors.15 The UEFA President forms it aside with 15 different members elected 
by a UEFA Congress (the President is elected for a four-year term by the UEFA member 
associations at the UEFA Congress, and periodically counsels with the UEFA Executive 
Committee). He is also responsible for presiding at the UEFA Congress as well as in the 
UEFA Executive Committee's meetings. In the case of a tie in any vote, the UEFA President 
casts a tiebreaking vote.   
The Organs for the Administration of Justice act as UEFA's disciplinary bodies, namely 
the Control, Ethics and Disciplinary Body and the Appeals Body; Ethics and Disciplinary 
Inspectors and the two-chamber Club Financial Control Body. The Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS), based in Lausanne, Switzerland, may also deal with disputes between UEFA 
and associations, leagues, clubs, players and officials, or disputes with a European dimension 
among the different stakeholders within this industry. The organisation of the administration 
of football is based on a pyramid system of regulations, with FIFA being the world governing 
body, UEFA the European governing body and national football associations the governing 
bodies at domestic level. The CAS shall have exclusive jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any 
ordinary court or any other court of arbitration, to deal with disputes in its capacity as an 
ordinary court of arbitration.16 
Despite this entire apparent democratic framework, the European Commission itself 
argued, in the Helsinki report published in 1999, that the pyramid structure of sports 
organizations in Europe gave almost an authentic monopoly to sports institutions. It is feared 
that the existence of different federations in the same sport could run the risk of causing 
further conflict.17   
This research is also motivated by a concern that the structure of the football pyramid18, 
and its consequent allocation of monopoly power to the sports federations, goes beyond what 
is required for the good dealing of European sport (especially football). A substantial degree 
of the monopoly power enjoyed by sports federations has profound trade implications, and it 
                                                 
15
 See, supra note 13, at Article 45º of the UEFA Statutes (Edition 2014) which states in its nº1 that: “the governance and compliance 
auditors shall periodically examine UEFA’s activities in terms of good governance, compliance and risk management. The Executive 
Committee shall issue corresponding regulations.”, p. 20. 
16
 See, supra note 13, at Article 61º - 63º, “Disputes of European Dimension”, p. 26. 
17
 Cf. S. Weatherill, European Sports Law, chapter 7, ASSER International Sports Law Series, Collected Papers, 2nd Edition Springer, pp. 
282-292, (2013). This article was first published in “The Helsinki Report on Sport”, EL Rev 25, pp. 3-7. (2000B). 
18
 Cf. S. Weatherill, European Sports Law, Chapter 12 “Is the Pyramid Compatible with EC Law?” chapter 12, ASSER International Sports 
Law Series, Collected Papers, 2nd Edition Springer, p, 296 (2013).  
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is claimed that the structure of the current composition pyramid is unsatisfactory to allow for 
proper representation and participation of all affected interests.  
Concerning the administration for justice, increasing litigation is waiting, and its potential 
impact is devaluated. In particular, this paper aims to emphasize the idea in favour of 
allowing a more direct participation in some decision-making aspects performed by the top 
clubs, which is only allowed by the pyramid structure. European competition law is 
recognised as a device to complete a restructuring of organizing the game. Some authors may 
consider UEFA’s FFP regulations as being a foe of competition, and some may not. 
Nonetheless, it is the purpose of this research to discuss a scenario favourable to an 
introduction of European competition law to European football and to all sports in general, to 
determine how the rules of the game should operate under a solid framework, in order to 
guarantee more honest and equitable competitions. 
After these introductory considerations, it must now be understood the reasons that led 
UEFA to adopt the financial fair play measures that we know today. Much of what is the 
financial behaviour of clubs may be related to the acquisition system of players and paying 
salaries, which may be assigned in three different manners by the clubs. Firstly, by their own 
youth development system (football academy), with various levels of teams spread by 
different group ages, to help the younger players evolve.19 It is expected that one day in the 
future those players can be part of the first team of the club.20 The second manner of acquiring 
new players results when multiple teams compete to sign the same international player21, by 
purchasing them with one club paying the other a transfer fee in exchange for the player.22 
Last but not least, the third way of acquiring players is signing a new contract with them once 
their contracts with their previous club have ended.  
This latter method of contracting players had its origin in a paradigmatic case of the 
CJEU, in 1995, the Bosman Case. It should be noted that, until then, the players whose 
contract had already expired required the payment of a transfer fee for the buyer club to the 
                                                 
19
 Blair Downey, “The Bosman Ruling: European Soccer – Above the Law?” 1 ASPER Rev. Int’L BUS. & Trade L.187, 189 (2001). 
20
 Rob Draper, “A league of their own: inside FC Barcelona's football academy, churning out future Messis...for free”, Daily Mail, electronic 
available at: www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-1265747/Inside-FC-Barcelonas-football-academy-churning-future-Messis--
free.html, (17 April 2010). 
21
 Matthew Piehl, (2010). “Double Play: How Major League Baseball Can Fix the Amateur Draft and International Player Acquisition with 
One Swing”, Willamette Sports Law Journal, p. 15.  
22
 Rick J. Lopez, Comment, “Signing Bonus Skimming and a Premature Call for a Global Draft in Major League Baseball”, 41 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 349, 353, 374 (2009). 
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previous club in which the player had performed so far. Jean-Marc Bosman, a Belgian 
football player, managed to prove that this transfer fee paid by a club to another to hire a 
player, when this contract has already expired player, violated the TFEU provisions on the 
free movement of workers requirements.23 
 After this landmark decision, all European nationals whose contracts expired were 
free to decide their future and keep up agreements with other clubswithout needing 
authorization from their former clubs.24 Considering the agency system and the astronomic 
transfer fees and salaries along with to the incapacity or disinterest of some sports agents in 
solving the problem, it is simple to understand why many clubs are facing serious financial 
problems during the past few years. 
2. The implementation of the mechanism 
Being aware of the financial issues of the great majority of European football clubs, the 
committee made use of its authority and decided to implement in 2003, the Club Licensing 
Regulations with the target of fixing minimum standards that ‘would apply to all clubs, across 
the entire UEFA associations, disregarding their size and degree of professionalism’.25 In a 
nutshell, these provisions specify that UEFA will grant an authorization of participation, vis-
à-vis a license to compete, for those teams who are interested in engaging in UEFA 
competitions, if they comply with certain minimum standards.26  
Nevertheless, despite the creation of this mechanism, the problems seem to persist, 
with clubs struggling every day to honour their liabilities on time, which made this a major 
priority concern to an active and competent UEFA. In September 2009, Karl-Heinz 
Rummenigge, the chairman of the European Club Association, announced that it was working 
in close collaboration with UEFA and developing concrete measures aimed at tackling 
overspending by the majority of clubs, through their regular contacts at the Professional 
Football Strategy Council.27 Accordingly, in 2010, the FFP legal provisions were approved by 
                                                 
23
 Case C-415/93, URBSFA v. Bosman, supra note 7, §99. 
24
 See Downey, supra note 11, at 189, 190. 
25
 UEFA Club Licensing Report, “Here to Stay”, p.4, (2004-2008). 
26
 UEFA, Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (2015) at Article 1(2)(c): “the minimum sporting, infrastructure, personnel 
and administrative, legal and financial criteria to be fulfilled by a club in order to be granted a licence by a UEFA member association as 
part of the admission procedure to enter the UEFA club competitions (chapter 3)”. 
27
 Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, EU Conference in Licensing Systems for Competitions, Introductory Speeches, Brussels (17 and 18 September 
2009). 
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UEFA in order to consolidate and reinforce the financial requirements demanded in the 
licensing proceedings and in which the first assessments were launched in 201128, and it was 
already known that doing so would be complex. It will demand a creative and careful 
reasoning allied with a certain degree of sacrifice in the short-term. On one hand, clubs need 
to understand that they must correct, modify and improve their excesses of the last few years.  
On the other hand changes in clubs’ performance by itself will not guide to financial 
stability. Changes must take place at all levels and should include all stakeholders within the 
game - not just the clubs. Therefore, it is urgent for players and their representatives to look at 
their own circumstances and try to perceive how they might lower wage demands, which 
constitutes a major cause of the many financial difficulties that have been performed by 
clubs.29  
In addition, it is worth stating the degree to which sports laws for the most indebted 
clubs are lax. As stated Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski, ‘when clubs get into trouble, 
they generally ‘do a Leeds: they cut their wages, get relegated and compete at a lower level. 
Imagine if other businesses could do this’.30 
The truth, however, is that some protectionism has allowed clubs to remain afloat. 
Obviously, these are the clubs with the most fans, with more titles and which therefore have a 
greater ability to withstand the high levels of debt that bother them. Yet, this happens due to 
the clubs’ belief that they are practically immortal. They continue to pursue this behaviour 
because they know by own experience that they can accumulate several losses and hold on.31 
3. The content of Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations 
As stated above, what made the Union of European Football Associations to impose the 
FFP regulations, were the concerns regarding the financial health of European football clubs. 
It is therefore no surprise that the objectives of the legal measures imposed by this new 
instrument targets the excessive level of expenditure that has been performed by the clubs. 
                                                 
28
 Financial Fair Play: “all you need to know”, (30 June 2015) available at: http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html, 
last upadated 30 June 2015. 
29
 See Karl-Heinz, supra note 19. 
30
 Simon Kuiper & Stefan Szimansky, “Soccernomics”, Harper Sport, (2012), p. 89. 
31
 Id. 
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Actually, article two of the provisions define the aims of FFP,32 with additional goals being 
included through the UEFA official website, which adds that the financial fair play concept 
was approved in order ‘to decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary 
effect; to encourage long-term investments in the youth sector and infrastructure’.33 
 To sum up, we can describe these goals as aiming to ensure the financial health of 
clubs and halting financial doping measures practiced by a large number of agents that make 
up the professional football industry. It is expected that clubs can replace their financial 
policy and adopt a new strategy towards a widely held sustainable development, seeking long 
term agreements that besides being based on sporting success are also branded by sustainable 
financial health, instead of short-term strategies distinguished by several and repeated losses, 
huge risk and moral hazard.  
As it is commonly known, UEFA laid the foundations of clubs tournament. More 
specifically, it is responsible for organising four club competitions - namely the UEFA 
Champions League, UEFA Europa League, UEFA Super Cup, and, more recently, the UEFA 
Youth League.34 Without exception, all of these European competitions represent the most 
reputable and profitable events in which a club can take part. Notably, the UEFA Champions 
League is arguably the most prestigious club competition within the entire football industry, 
along with other major sport events.35 
More than 1.03 billion euros in winnings were allocated amidst the top European 
football clubs in the ultimate Champions League edition, season 2014-2015. Crushed finalists 
Juventus earned the most earnings of the competition, pocketing a sum of 89.1 million euros. 
Surprisingly, the last winning team, Barcelona, collected smaller amounts that earned by 
Juventus, its rival at the Berlin final, last year, in Germany - the Catalan team garnered around 
61 million euros with its participation in the competition. 
                                                 
32
 UEFA, “Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations” (2015) at Article 2(2) states that: ‘to improve the economic and financial 
capability of the clubs, increasing their transparency and credibility;   to place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to 
ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with employees, social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually;   to introduce more discipline and 
rationality in club football finances;   to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues;   to encourage responsible spending 
for the long-term benefit of football;   to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football’.   
33
 UEFA, Financial Fair Play, electronic available at: http://www.uefa.org/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-financial-fair-
play/index.html (last updated 1, July, 2015). 
34
 See, UEFA, Uefa Competitions, electronic available at: http://www.uefa.org/documentlibrary/competitions/, (last visited 19, Feb, 2016). 
35
  See, Monte Burke, “The Richest sporting events in the world”, Forbes, The Litlle Book of Billionaire Secrets, “How to turn $20k into $20 
million in 12 years or $1,2m in 30 years”, electronic available at: http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mme45efhm/uefa-champions-league/, (last 
visited 19, Feb, 2016). 
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The most noteworthy winning among the English squads was Manchester City 
(€45.85m), trailed by Chelsea (€39.23m), Arsenal (€36.38m) and Liverpool (€33.59m). An 
aggregate of €42m circulated among the 20 teams included in the play-offs and in early stages 
of the competition, the rest being distributed to the 32 associations included from the group 
stage onwards. Each team is entitled to a minimum of €12m just by participating in the group 
stage - with the group stage valued at €1m per win and €500.000 per draw. There was extra 
prize money of €5.5m for entering into the last 16, €6m for achieving the quarterfinals and 
€7m for achieving the semi-finals. The final winners get €15m while runners-up receive 
€10.5m.36 
Notwithstanding this prize cash, groups were likewise honoured with broadcasting 
revenue commonly known as TV cash.37 The sum given to every club relied on the 
corresponding estimation of national TV market and, additionally, on the quantity of clubs 
from that country in the competition. The capability of generating broadcasting revenue may 
vary across European football since the signing of new broadcasting contracts differs from 
league to league.38 
Italy's TV business sector is a huge part of the general scheme. However, there were 
just two Italian teams in the group stages, and consequently Juventus had to share that cash 
with Roma, thereby leaving the competition with the most cash. Meanwhile, Barcelona 
needed to share its broadcasting revenue channels between Real Madrid, Atletico Madrid and 
Athletic Bilbao. Likewise UEFA distributed €2.9m among 19 national affiliations whose 
members contended in last season's competition.39 
An increase in the Champions League prize money capital for the next three-year 
cycle 2015-18 was also announced. The difference is significant, with a 50% increase in the 
“Participation Bonus” which is guaranteed for all 32 teams. The previous amount shared 
between every team that qualifies for the group stages of champions league will now jump to 
€12m starting from 2015-16 season.40  
                                                 
36
 Cf. UEFA, “UEFA Champion League revenue distribution”, retrieved from: 
http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=1858497.html, (last updated, 31 May 2015). 
37
 Deloitte Report, Top of the table, “Football Money League”, 2016, Sports Business Group, p.24. 
38
  See, supra note 6, 5.1.1.2, “broadcasting revenue”, p. 19. 
39
 Hamish Mackay, “The Mirror”, “Champions League Prize money 2014/15 – see how much your club earned last season”, electronic 
available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/champions-league-prize-money-201415-6680392, (last updated, 22 Oct. 2015). 
40Totalsportek2, “UEFA Champions League Prize Money 2016 Breakdown”, electronic available available at: 
http://www.totalsportek.com/money/uefa-champions-league-prize-money/ (27, Jan, 2016). 
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Consequently, with this amount of money involved, it is simple to conceive why any 
European club will intend to conform to the regulations. At least, those that have the 
opportunity to qualify for these tournaments through their accomplishments in the domestic 
competitions, at a national level. Actually, in season 2011/2012, 591 of the 730 top-division 
clubs experienced the licensing procedure, which relates on a sum of 81% of every single top 
club.41 
3.1. Harmonisation attempt 
Choosing not to apply for a club license and just competing in their respective 
domestic league may not be a generous option. Those clubs that were not keen on applying 
for the licensing procedure, and therefore avoid the assessment of their financial situation by 
the UEFA Supervisory Authority – the Club Financial Control Body – did not fully escape 
from the new legal framework. It must be pointed out that all domestic leagues of each 
European country also have legal provisions to license their own competitions and these are, 
as a rule, moulded by the previous criteria settled by UEFA namely Annex III regarding the 
Integration of part II of these regulations into national club licensing regulations and Annex II 
concerning the provisions of delegation of licensing and monitoring responsibilities to an 
affiliated league.  
We have witnessed an example of this after the conduct adopted by the English football 
clubs with both Barclays Premier League and the lower football divisions in introducing a 
similar version, underpinned by FFP legal framework.42 They have sporting sanctions that can 
be invoked should the financial affairs of a club have been mismanaged resulting in an 
insolvency event, they have rules enabling the League to settle any overdue club debts to 
other clubs including non-Premier League clubs and they operate a Fit and Proper Person Test 
for company directors and shareholders that goes above and beyond UK Company Law. They 
also have a requirement for clubs to disclose material payments to the English Football 
Association. 
                                                 
41
 Communications, “Finanical Fair Play Media Information” (25 Jan 2012).  
42
 Khan, J., 2009. “EU Conference on Licensing Systems for Club Competitions”, Draft Presentation, representing English football clubs. 
The author recognises that ‘since the introduction of UEFA licensing for European Club competitions we have implemented licensing rules 
for European competitions and more recently we introduced the same financial criteria to our own competition rules. We therefore find the 
Premier League fully aligned to current UEFA Licensing philosophy but we have arrived at this juncture through actively canvassing the 
positive benefits of licensing in terms of financial stability and public accountability to our Clubs’, pp. 4-5).  
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4. The Club Licensing Procedure 
As before mentioned, the next considerations assess legal provisions that will only apply 
to European competitions, forcing national leagues to establish their own means of 
supervision and to regulate the obligations of the clubs, in order to enable them to obtain the 
necessary licencing to compete. It is pursued through this regulatory instrument, in the words 
of FIFA itself, that sports competitions are safeguarded, increasing the professionalism level 
of the game as well as promoting financial transparency of sporting bodies, by stopping 
financial doping behaviours of wealthy owners and managers.43  
These principles should be, according to the FIFA Licensing Regulations, transposed to 
the FIFA’s confederations (UEFA, CONCACAF, CAF, CONMBOL, for example), to be 
implemented on the scale of continents. Each national Federation that composes the 
Confederations should strive for the best measures in order to attain its intended purposes. 
With this being said, it should be noted that one of the biggest obstacles to the club licencing 
system and that may prevent the achievement of financial fair play recommended parameters 
lies in the salary issue that are paid to the professional athletes. 
 Obviously, and as is demonstrated above by the objectives pursued by the measure, 
other duties must be fulfilled, but the truth is that the wage payments are a major concern for 
regulatory bodies in European football. Thus, paragraph 1 of Annex VIII of the UEFA 
Licensing Regulation considers that unpaid wages are those that have not been settled in 
accordance with the agreement. Subsequently, the number 2 of the same article mitigates this 
rule saying that wage amounts are deemed to be paid if the club proved that on 31 March, 30 
June and 30 September has paid the totality of the outstanding amount or has a written 
agreement with the creditor to extend the deadline for payment on time, even beyond the 
indicated dates.44 
                                                 
43
 We are familiar with one of the greatest European examples on the matter, a very illustrative example of how the instrument under study 
works and to whom it applies. Using the example of AS Monaco FC, who invested hundreds of millions of euros on transfer players and 
wages, like the case of Radamel Falcao, João Moutinho or James Rodriguez. Still, the men of the Monegasque principality did not infringe 
the financial rules, so they were allowed to participate in the next European competitions editions. It should be added that AS Monaco FC 
was playing in the French Second League (League 2). To have more information about the topic please consult: Michael Bertin, “The 
Strange Story Behind Falcao’s Blockbuster Move to Monaco”, (3, June, 2013), electronic available at: http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-
strange-story-behind-falcaos-blockbuster-move-to-moncao/. 
44
 A club that saw the application of this provision to go from paper to practice was Vitoria Guimarães SC. The Portuguese team, during the 
2011/2012 seasons, failed to meet the financial requirements to participate in the UEFA Europa League, and therefore ended giving up such 
participation. The proper Portuguese Football Federation denied this liscencing process to the “conquerors”. 
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Another possibility for not considering that payments are in arrears will be the 
possibility of clubs filing a court challenge against the lender who is claiming the retribution. 
Such pleading acts as challenging the application, showing that the payments were liquidated 
in the due time, or by presenting any exception (peremptory or dilatory) that enables the 
lender not to pay. Consider, however, that such provisions are not applicable according to the 
law of each country, but by the standards of the upper body of the European football. Ipso 
modo, the CAS judgment that decided the exclusion of Malaga from European competitions 
was clear in stating that the concept of overdue payments is not arbitrary and does not take in 
consideration were the defaulting club is domiciled, but it is aimed at attending a uniform idea 
issued by UEFA in order to avoid differential treatment.45 Nevertheless, such precepts did not 
manage to establish the desired balance, since the UEFA itself has demonstrated a permissive 
behaviour in applying hefty penalties – specifically, the exclusion of European competitions - 
to clubs with less status.46  
On the other hand, they opt for other penalty measures concerning clubs that can 
manage to present large margins of profit. Indeed, and not trying to defend the entities that 
failed to comply, the truth is that this regulation only served to increase the differences 
between the top and powerful clubs and the remaining ones. The wealthiest continue to 
participate in European competitions with the right of receiving great prize money, premium 
participations, signing new lucrative television and advertising contracts whilst others feel the 
economic difficulties increasing. Apart from the ticket receipts reduction they will not also 
take advantage of participation premiums or the outcome of any positive results in UEFA 
competitions. 
These facts are closely connected with the assumptions of the financial fair play 
instrument, requiring that beyond the premise mentioned regarding the overdue payables, the 
sports companies must comply with a requirement that will be deeply stressed, later on, in my 
research. This requirement, the break-even one, is empirically characterized by requiring that 
                                                 
45 Clifford J. Hendel Partner Araoz & Rueda Abogados, “Regulations: Málaga CF v. UEFA: lessons for financial fair play”, World Sports Law Report, 
Volume: 11, Issue: 12, pp. 3-4. 
46
 Case C-2013/A/3067, Málaga CF SAD v. UEFA, arbitral award of 08 October 2013 In this, the court clearly states that: “The idea to 
define in a uniform manner –- and independently of where a club is domiciled –- the term “overdue” is, thus, not arbitrary, but instead 
perfectly in line with the principle of freedom of association. This also follows from CAS jurisprudence (CAS 2012/A/2702, para. 91) 
according to which ”[p]ursuant to Art. 154 of the Swiss Act concerning Private Law, the UEFA regulations cannot be overridden  by the 
national laws as this would lead to unequal treatment among clubs from different countries. ..”, §9.4, p.15. 
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a club most honour its duties, must not spend more than it generates, and must live in 
accordance with their means. 
In order to support this idea, a pertinent example is the Portuguese approach to the 
matter, in which the clubs are obligated, under article 53 of the League of Professional 
Football Competitions Regulations to liquidate the existing debts with the organiser. 
Moreover, at the time of the registration process in one of the existing professional 
competitions - Premier League, which is more relevant, and Second League - it is mandatory 
that the applicant clubs apply for registration - under penalty of impossibility of registration 
contracts of new athletes or using athletes with contracts already registered in previous 
seasons - and that clubs submit certificates evidencing that the tax situation and pertaining to 
social security is regularized, unless they are facing legal  disputes and/or tax oppositions. 
In European competitions, the regulators who proceed with the club licensing 
process47 shall require that each club prove that as of 31 March preceding the license season it 
has no overdue payables towards football clubs (article 49), in respect of employees (article 
50) and social/tax authorities (article 50 bis). All these requirements will be presented when 
one introduce, furthermore, the notion of the break-even rule. 
Concerning article 14 which encompasses the “license” concept, it should be given 
special emphasis to the provisions of n.4, a). 
This rule states that if the club that already possesses a license to compete becomes 
insolvent, the same should be withdrawn. However, and contrary to what usually is pursued in 
the entire document, UEFA demonstrated a rare concern regarding the financial situation of 
the most depleted teams. Hence, if the CFCB predicted that if a club is found in liquidation, 
but there was a major objective of financial salvation, the authorization should not be 
revoked. In addition to the protection of the financial health of the clubs, the legislature's 
intention was that the provision meet the standards and assures the preservation of truth and 
integrity in sports.  
Actually, preventing a club from competing in an advanced state of a given 
competition would lead to questionable outcomes - there might exist “secretariat winners” 
rather than the victories are decided in the appropriate place. Despite this apparent openness 
to clubs that are in financial recovery process, UEFA can act in a diametrically opposite way. 
                                                 
47
 See, supra note 26, at article 14, p. 13. 
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Indeed, it has the power to revoke the decision of a national organ that granted the internal 
license to compete in European competitions.  
This happened because it is fruit of the prevalence of sports laws issued by UEFA, at 
an European level, that take precedence over the national laws of each country. This rule is 
based on a concern of equity and impartiality of the organization regarding the assessments 
that are executed under European supervision.48 This could happen in a country where the 
insolvency provisions and corporate recovery laws are more permissive, in order to subvert 
the required financial regulation system.49 
Although UEFA argues in its general principles that take into account all cases and 
performs its analysis separately and individually, the truth is that this analysis has been 
conducive to greater asymmetries between clubs with financial power and others that are in 
contingency to find revenue sources that allow them to liquidate their debts. 
Being the representative institution of all federations and concurrently of all European 
clubs, it can be considered that UEFA is the sponsor of this scenario by not assuring that the 
mechanisms established by it are provided with parity and allow a fair competition, on equal 
terms. 
The application of this institute only began in season 2013/2014, to allow clubs to 
adapt to the new rules, particularly those clubs that depended on the direct intervention of the 
money from wealthy owners to cover the losses. The UEFA Financial Control Body as per 
Article 54 of its Regulations should monitor the licensing request made by the entity that 
wants to compete in European competitions should execute such control. These liabilities are 
related to national associations that have a duty to cooperate with the first in examining the 
feasibility of the application for registration. 
In order to comply with this duty, the licensing application shall be made following 
the procedure of paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the CL&FFP regulation and will start by the 
                                                 
48
 Cf. Pritha Sarkar and Iain Rogers, REUTERS, “UPDATE1 – Soccer Mallorca to appeal European exclusion at CAS”, p.1, electronic 
available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/soccer-europa-mallorca-idUKLDE66R23E20100730, (last updated: 30, Jul, 2010). 
49
 In 2012, it was granted a license to compete to RCD Mallorca, by the competent national authorities in this particular case, the Real 
Federácion Española de Fútbol RFEF). However, despite UEFA had received all the documentation of the RFEF with licensing, decided to 
investigate an insolvency action against the club, which ran in the city court, even with credit claims and attempts to negotiate with creditors. 
Therefore, in this sense, the club from the Balearic Islands lost the right to compete in European competitions and was replaced by the team 
that preceded it at the end of the season, Villarreal Club de Fútbol. Cf. Juan D. C. Pérez, “El Fair Play Financiero En El Fútbol: El Caso del 
Real Mallorca Y Su Exclusión de la UEFA Europa League de la Temporada 2010-2011” available at: http://www.ruizcrespo.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/18-articulo%20austral-fair-play-financiero.pdf. See also, UEFA, Disciplinary, available at: 
http://www.uefa.org/disciplinary/news/newsid=1509489.html (last updated, 11 May, 2014). 
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submission of the relevant documentation related to the applicants’ license, by the national 
association, to UEFA. Subsequently, UEFA should respond to such submission, notifying the 
national federation of the decision, together with the list of all teams admitted to UEFA 
competitions. This process highlights the aforementioned duty of cooperation, which arises 
from the need for all agents to carry out a joint effort of sports moralization, for it to become 
fairer and more sustainably competitive, with the sports component overlapping the financial 
one. Besides not granting the license, other disciplinary measures may be imposed under 
Article 72 of CL&FFP, with clubs failing to meet the financial requirements being 
sanctioned.50 There are a number of potential sanctions for not complying with the provisions. 
What sanction will affect the failing club depends on the grade of violation, where a 
warming is the mildest sanction and exclusion from the future UEFA competitions and 
withdrawal of title/awards are the most severe punishments.51 An exception to this straitjacket 
lies in Article 15 of the CL&FFP regulations, which provides the possibility of clubs 
obtaining a special license if they have not undergone any licensing process or have been 
entered at a lower level by not participating in professional competitions. This event will 
happen when, for sporting merit, the club has obtained the right to participate in European 
competitions. Sometimes, merit for the victory or just the presence in a final of their countries 
cup, despite not having participated in the major leagues of it, which guarantees direct access 
to those prestigious tournaments.  
To summarize, Club Licensing is used to be eligible to participate in UEFA club 
competitions. Clubs must obtain a license issued by the competent national body. In case of 
doubt as to whether a club fulfils the admission criteria, the UEFA General Secretary52 may 
refer the case to the CFCB -  (the “Admission Procedure”). Club monitoring encompasses 
that clubs that have been granted a license must comply with the “monitoring requirements” 
of the CL&FFP regulations, (e.g.: ‘no overdue payables’ requirement).53 
                                                 
50
 Cf. UEFA, Settlement agreements: details, electronic available at: http://www.uefa.org/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-financial-
fair-play/news/newsid=2244685.html, (last updated, 08 May, 2015).  
51
 See; supra note 26, at Article 8, “Catalogue of Sanctions”, pp.11-12. 
52
  Until these days Gianni Infantino was UEFA’s General Secretary. Nowadays, he is the FIFA’s President. See more information about the 
topic in David Conn, The Guardian, “Everything you need to know about Gianni Infantino”, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/feb/26/gianni-infantino-fifa-president, (last visited, 26 Feb, 2016). 
53
 UEFA CL&FFP (2015), Part III UEFA Club Monitoring, Chapter 1, “Other monitoring requeirements”, at Articles 65-67 (as further 
detailed in ANNEX IX which provide that clubs must not be overdue on payments to other football clubs, employees or social and tax 
authorities). 
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4.1. The Break-Even requirement 
As mentioned above, the break-even requirement will be the central feature of this 
licensing process of the clubs. Thus, the notion of “break-even” result is introduced in Article 
60 of the CL&FFP regulations. This clearly defines that "the difference between relevant 
income and relevant expenses is the break-even result, which must be calculated in 
accordance with Annex X for each reporting period”.54 Following, clubs should presented 
positive fiscal assessments translated into a positive balance sheet, with more income than 
expenses. The ‘relevant income’ and ‘relevant expenses’ concepts are defined in Article 58 
with additional information set in Annex X. 
 Thus, these concepts highlight some of the most important aspects of the rules that 
constitute the object of the present research. At a first glance, ‘relevant income’ is restricted to 
income arising from football operations55, which may vary between match day revenues, to 
sponsorship and broadcasting details and profit on players transfers. On the other hand, 
‘relevant expenses’ includes player transfers, wages and related costs among with other 
operating expenses.  
There are also anti-evasion mechanisms like arm’s-length trading and related party 
transaction criteria56, which will be analysed with more attention below.   
Typically, the ‘break-even’ requirement is assessed by taking in consideration the 
three previous reporting periods, with the aggregate of those three periods being the 
‘aggregate break even result’.57 There is just an exception in the first monitoring period’s 
assessment, which only considers the two previous monitoring periods.58 If the ‘aggregate 
break-even result’ is negative it represents an 'aggregate break-even deficit’ for that 
monitoring period.59 
However, given the financial difficulties that clubs had until the introduction of this 
new mechanism, UEFA predicted in the article the possibility of clubs to present an 
acceptable deviation from the break-even result up to 5 million by 2018.60 From the first 
2013/14 monitoring period, an owner can invest up to €45m over two seasons in exchange for 
                                                 
54
 See, supra note 26, at Article 60, p.37. 
55
 See, supra note 26, at Article 58 nº1, p.36. 
56
 See, G. Daniel, “The UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules: a Difficult Balancing Act”, (2001)  ESLJ 50, §9, p.2. 
57
 See, supra note 26, at Article 59, p.37. 
58
 Id, at Article 59 and 59 nº2. 
59
 Ibid., at Artcile 60 nº2. 
60
 Ibid., at Article 61º. 
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more shares in the club. It means that wealthy owners can only have, after the 2013-14 
season, on average, the opportunity to spend €15m worth of cash for shares each yearn the 
club, vis – à - vis on transfers fees and wages61, and so forth.  That figure is reduced to €10m 
per season (€30m over three seasons) for the 2015-16 season. If an owner does not put any 
money into a club by way of cash for shares, each club’s acceptable loss suffers a 
considerable decreasing, being just €5m over three years.62 
4.2. Relevant Income 
The notion of relevant income encompasses the several revenues sources of clubs. It 
ranges from gate receipts, broadcasting rights, sponsorship, advertising and other commercial 
activities and operating income. The profits made on disposal of players registrations or 
income derived from it, excess earnings on disposal of fixed assets and finance income are 
also accountable for the purpose of Article 58. As we can see, the supra definition of ‘relevant 
income’, presented in Article 58 of the CL&FFP regulations, only encompasses income that 
arises out of football operations. Nonetheless, it does not take in consideration the equity 
injections derived from the clubs’ wealthy owners, explaining why clubs nowadays struggling 
to comply with the rules.  
These happens because they are constrained in their ability to include income derived 
from their wealthy owners in the BE’s control. Subsequently, clubs cannot boost relevant 
income, (e.g. derived from sponsor deals) or shrink relevant expenses (e.g. derived from 
purchased services like the rent of the stadium), through dealings with related parties, in order 
to fulfil the break-even prerequisite.63 
The rationale behind this is to avoid situations like those seen in Chelsea FC, TSG 
1899 Hoffenheim, Anzhi Makhachkala, and so forth. The best-known example of financial 
doping is the huge investment into Chelsea FC made by the Russian oligarch Roman 
Abramovich. This investment was taken right after his winning control of the English Premier 
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 See, supra note 48. 
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 Id, at Article 61º nº2, p.38. 
63
 J. Christian et al., “The Financial Fair Play Regulations of UEFA: An adequate Concept to Ensure the Long-Term Viability and 
Sustainability of European Club Football?”, International Journal of Sport Finance, , Vol 7, nº 2, 2012, West Virginia University, p.130. 
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League club management in 2003, which prompted public notice all over Europe.64 Since 
Abramovich’s appointment, the catalogue of teams65 whose decision-making powers have 
been assumed by wealthy investors has constantly increased, with English clubs being 
transformed into a ‘sweet pot’ (e.g. Liverpool FC, Manchester United, Manchester City).66  In 
January 2011, Russian billionaire investor and politician Suleiman Kerimov purchased his 
hometown club Anzhi Makhachkala, with the aim of transforming it in one of the most 
prestigious clubs in the world. Notwithstanding, Kerimov suddenly lost interest in the project, 
drastically decreasing the budget and selling the key players of the squad.67 Since their 
relegation in season 2013/2014, the club is nowadays back in the Russian Premier League, the 
highest tier of football domestically and it is trying to achieve more stability. 
As a rule, it could be said that the more prosperous a club is, the better its chances to 
increase money back from wealthy owners because of its higher business potential. Müller et 
al. delineate the degree to which this angle is distorted by financial doping and 
correspondingly the alleged status of equivalent open doors is damaged.  An inordinate 
outside financing scheme performed by the clubs seems to abuse ‘sport-moral’ guidelines, 
from the time when subsidizing can be given freely from sport success, the tradition and 
notoriety of the club.68 
Backing into the Anzhi Makhachkala situation, evidently, it was neither the notoriety 
of the club (established not sooner than 1991) nor exceptional performance achievement in 
the field that stimulated the Russian takeover nor the signing of players renown worldwide 
from there on. Such cases undermine the principle of legitimacy69 - nowadays, clubs do not 
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 Pending the mid of 2012, Abramovich supposedly invested more than a billion Euros into the club. Cf. Gibson, O., 2012. “Chelsea record 
their first profit of the Roman Abramovich era”, The Guardian online, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/nov/09/chelsea-
record-profit-roman-abramovich-era. 
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 Regarding TSG 1899 Hoffenheim's situation is public noticed that during his childhood, Dietmar Hopp played in youth teams and has 
since become the chief financial backer of the club. He watched them rise and shine from the fifth tier of German football to the Bundesliga. 
Cf.  Ryan J. Bailey, Featured Colomunist, Bleacher Report, “Ranking the 10 Richest Football Owners inthe Forbes Billionaire Rich List”, 
available at: http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1980581-ranking-the-10-richest-football-owners-in-the-forbes-billionaire-rich-list/page/11 
(last updated 4, March, 2014), p.11. 
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 Cf., supra note 65. 
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 Schubert, M. & Könecke, T., 2014. “’Classical’ doping, financial doping and beyond: UEFA’s financial fair play as a policy of anti-
doping.” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 6940, pp.1–24.  
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 Hall, S., Szymanski, S., & Zimbalist, A. S. (2002), “Testing causality between team performance and payroll—The cases of Major League 
Baseball and English soccer”, Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 149–168. See more info, Simmons, R., & Forrest, D. (2004), “Buying 
success: Team performance and wage bills in U.S. and European sports leagues.” In R. Fort & J. Fizel (Eds.), International sports 
economics comparisons, pp. 123–140). Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.  
69
 Lenk, H., 2010. “Sport von Kopf bis Fuß(ball)”. Berlin: Lit. p.10. 
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necessarily need to achieve good results and, even so, wealthy owners are willing to subsidize 
them.  
At the present, the overall difficulty regarding the indispensable level of equal 
opportunities might also be appraised. Succeeding the rationale of Daumann70, Müller et al.71 
rationale, it should be noted that ‘it is neither possible nor preferable to fully equalize all 
factors that have an influence on a particular competition; for example, cultural, sociological 
and economic determinants’. Nevertheless, an unregulated professional European sports 
framework tends to increasingly monopolize the market industry, due to a self-propagating 
winding of success - an underlying achievement stimulates higher income that thus can be 
utilized to fortify the group, making future achievement considerably more likely.  
An answer for this may be an extra redistribution of income as a solution for market 
flaws and for the avoidance of the recognised predominance of a few clubs. Governance of 
this kind could breach the legitimacy of competitions, breaking the establishment and the 
targets of games. Another risk could be the reaction of fans and spectators, which comprises 
one of the key business foundations of this industry. 
Another critical topic is whether CL&FFP is justified by a cost-benefit evaluation. 
Notwithstanding the aims and purposes of these provisions, the costs of regulation affected by 
implementing, monitoring and enforcing the CL&FFP mechanism are prospective to be 
considered high, which complicates the UEFA’s job of ensuring that all licenses are granted, 
or not, in the due time. This occurs because on one hand, the clubs will ostensibly aim to 
comply with the BE requirements, while on the other hand trying to declare income from non-
football operations as ‘relevant income’72, adulterating and misrepresenting the rules of the 
game. In the meantime, UEFA’s legal authorities are still confused in the middle of their own 
regulations and the sports industry is being continuously discredited.  
4.2.1 The Financial Doping status quo of the clubs 
Despite how and by whom the cash is given, a wide scope of these money injections 
have a mutual feature, that is the cash given 'vaguely', meaning that it arises out of non-
football operations that have nothing to do with the day-to-day running business. It is the 
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disproportionate degree of these measures that is perceived as a foe of competition by 
contenders and its spirit is in many cases criticized for being financial doping. First, Arsenal 
FC manager Arséne Wenger ostensibly used the term ‘financial doping’ when speculating 
about Roman Abramovich’s investments.73 As formerly introduced, the term is used more and 
more by social media as well as among the several football stakeholders. The first to attempt 
an academic definition of the concept described ‘financial doping’ as ‘financial means not 
earned by a club directly or indirectly through its sporting operations or supporter reputation, 
but rather provided by an external investor, benefactor or creditor detached from sporting 
merit and supporter reputation as well as from sustainable investment motivations.’74  
By including financial specialists and also leasers and advocates and subsequently 
augmenting the potential vehicles of cash flow, the authors cover the distinctive practices 
beforehand portrayed. In any case, the last part of the definition appears to be risky:  
'separated (…) from supportable speculation inspirations'. Following the author's reasoning, ‘a 
sustainable use of finance in the case of football clubs would be realized by temperately 
investing in infrastructure or youth development and not by covering pathological financial 
deficits caused by overspending on salaries and transfer fees’.75 This description is evidently 
based on the respective remarks in UEFA’s CL&FFP rules, Annex X.76  
Financial doping can in the first place be perceived as the situation in which a sports 
entity borrows irresponsibly in order to contract and pay high-performing players, threatening 
the entity’s long-term sustainability. Secondly, the condition in which the owner of a sports 
entity invests his or her own personal capital to assure top players, before trusting on the 
revenue the entity is able to produce for itself. It is clear that financial doping may be 
understood in a very restrictive way, based on UEFA’s FFP regulation, or in a slightly 
extensive approach. In the following, it is reasonable to assume that financial doping is 
regarded as being illegitimate by a sufficiently high number of stakeholders and deemed to be 
breaching the law issued by the corresponding regulating body.  
If they wish access to European competitions, managers will have to run clubs based 
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on payrolls that allow them to stay within the hard limit drawn by their football income and 
the ‘total’ acceptable deviation defined in the FFP regulations. In any case, as we have seen, 
wealthy owners are no longer able to save a club for licensing procedure purposes if the latter 
overinvested in compensation (e.g. salaries and transfers) with the outcome that relevant 
expenses surpass significant income by more than the ‘aggregate’ acceptable deviation. 
Understanding ex ante the result of summing maximum permitted deficit plus the external 
money injections, contemplated by UEFA for authorizing purposes, football administrators 
will have no choice other than to relax their clubs' financial plan ex post.77 In the event that 
they wish to participate in UEFA’s European competitions, administrators will need to 
manage clubs in order to have balance sheets that permit them to comply within the hard cap 
drawn by their football wage system and the maximum acceptable deviation criteria branded 
in the CL&FFP regulations. 
4.3. Relevant Expenses 
The idea is pacifically deciphered in a way that motivates the use the money for the 
future advancement of the clubs, grounded in supportable development with long-term 
perspectives, rather than in short horizons. In any case, the definition distinctly states that 
points of interest, like expenditure on youth development and community costs, and financial 
expenditure specifically inferable from the construction of tangible fixed assets, are prohibited 
under the BE's appraisal.78  
Expenses defined in section C n.1 of Annex X include costs of sales and materials, 
employee benefits expenditures, amortisation79 and impairment related to player registrations, 
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loss on disposal of player registrations (or costs of acquiring player registration), finance costs 
and dividends. The prohibition of account expenses sustained in building tangible fixed assets 
is likewise noteworthy. As a result it presents the differences between good debt and bad debt, 
where obligations tackled to create, e.g. another stadium or invested in the youth development 
sector is viewed as great, while obligations tackled as to buy new players or to fulfil players' 
pay commitments are viewed as awful.  It is important to point out that this qualification is 
totally consistent with UEFA's point of view, for empowering dependable spending for the 
long-term advantage of football. However, perceiving that this is a political or worth 
judgment by UEFA, based on enhancing the general social welfare of football in the future, as 
opposed to on what might be the greatest advantage of individual football clubs or specific 
private partners of those clubs.80 
On one hand, some may argue that the rationale behind the above findings on clubs is 
dual, as it stops rich promoters from contributing an unlimited amount of money on signing 
new players and paying their astronomic compensations (e.g. benefits like signature prizes) 
over a few time. On the other hand, it also prevents clubs from spending at a level that they 
can't sustain, risking to struggle with insolvency issues. These mandatory criteria are 
evidently substantial in terms of CL&FFP objectives given that they are grounded on a 
framework that comprehends the distinct nature of football, its clubs and competitions.  
Henceforth, UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations inform football as a proper ground to 
scrutinize how best to provide an alternative understanding of clubs’ performance and 
commitment, financially and socially speaking. Broadening the number of fictions told about 
them and focusing on distinctive ways of considering and of distinctive things to grasp.81 In 
associations such as football clubs the power of connections between the club and its several 
partners is considered as vital. Supporters, representatives and communities might be 
perceived as just as essential as money streams, profits and debt schemes. In addition, there is 
support of rightful and persistent enthusiasm for the implementation of these foundations 
from different governmental sectors, general society, and the third sector.  
The accountability process could be seen in a broader perspective and that would 
likely enable clubs to display a more positive scenario of their societal part than is actually the 
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situation.82 This methodology is additionally reliable behind the rationale that in order not to 
lose focus on their true foundations as non-profit-driven associations – which practically 
speaking, constitutes the most common feature that football clubs represent, in spite of their 
corporate governance structure 83 – the clubs should have management and reporting 
structures that deal with multiple bottom lines and which emphasize a holistic conception of 
the organization.84  
Therefore, ‘relevant income’ and ‘relevant expenses’ concepts enshrined in CL&FFP 
can be described as a type of normative regulation85 whereas excluded areas86 also generate 
some controversy since they are seen as a subterfuge for clubs practice financial doping by 
that allows clubs to deceiving costs, as well as an escape from the sanctions stipulated by 
UEFA if a club overspend. 
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4.4. Related Party Transactions 
Relevant income and relevant expenses from related parties must be adjusted to reflect 
the fair value of any such transactions as Article 58º §3 regards. To ensure that owners of 
clubs are not capable of financial doping in clubs’ revenues constitutes the specific purpose of 
the legislature with this rule. This provision is strictly linked to relate parties’ concepts 
enshrined in Annex X (F) of the CL&FFP regulations. The article mentions ‘related party, 
related party transactions and fair value of related party transactions’.87  
So as to mitigate these concerns, the CL&FFP expressly incorporates the concept of 
‘fair value’, by which any ‘related party’ transaction must be assessed. Moreover, given the 
amount of money involved within this industry, it seems almost predictable that 
disagreements will rise regarding who or what determines a ‘related party’ for the purpose of 
a particular financial transaction and then, what is understood by the term ‘fair value’ of the 
related party’s transaction. Previously, there were some cases (for example, ground or shirt 
sponsorship deals) that raised precisely this type of issue.88 According to UEFA’s CL&FFP 
regulations a related party is a person or entity that is related to the entity that is preparing its 
financial statements.  
UEFA call it the reporting entity, directed to the substance of the relationship and not 
merely the legal form, with the attention being given in considering each possible related 
party relationship.89 According to other very specific criteria, other person or closer members 
of that person’s family who may possibly interfere in the business are also liable for the 
purpose of related transactions purposes.90 It must now be clarified what is UEFA’s point of 
view regarding third parties transactions. UEFA deemed a related party transaction as a 
transfer of resources, services or obligations between linked parties notwithstanding of 
whether a price has been charged.91 
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As highlighted above, a related party transaction may, or may not, have taken place at 
fair value. This concept is enshrined in CL&FFP regulations with the legislature setting that 
fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between 
knowledgeable willing parties in an arm’s-length transaction.92 An arrangement or a 
transaction is deemed to be ‘not transacted on an arm’s length basis’ if it has been undertaken 
on terms more favourable to either party to the arrangement, than would have been obtained if 
there had been no related party relationship.93 
 At first glance injections of money seem to be advantageous as they bring extra 
money into the clubs’ pocket which – behind some traditional points of view – increases the 
level of the game, make stakeholders (namely the consumers) happier, players wealthier, and 
so forth.  Nevertheless, deceiving money injections are not a synonymous that simply 
translate into more money for the budget, because they might have the capability to adversely 
affect potential managerial incentives and decision-making processes within the football 
industry.94 As before mentioned, the BE’s result assessment may be softened by the provision 
which opens the opportunity, under certain strict criteria, of reflecting funding of youth 
development sectors and infrastructure throughout an outside investor, as non-relevant 
expenses. Nonetheless, such practices could hypothetically be classified as a development in 
the UEFA’s mechanism, being a way of progressively softening the rules. Yet, since they 
continue permissible under certain gaps they might me subject to the perceived question of 
legitimacy because exceptions and thresholds might open the door for circumventing the 
spirit of the law.  
Whereas UEFA has not made enough efforts as to exclude sponsorship money by 
related parties and it should be added that CL&FFP entails considerable stipulations in respect 
of related party transactions. Annex VI states that there must be confirmation ‘that related 
party transactions were made on terms equivalent to those that prevail in arm’s length 
transactions’.95 These provisions, in connection with CL&FFP Annex X, establishes that if 
the projected fair value is different from the recorded value then the income considered 
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relevant must be adjusted suitably but reminding that no further adjustments can be made to 
relevant income.96  
 Somehow surprisingly, UEFA mention the example of support by a related party.97 
However, if Manchester City’s sponsorship agreement seems like a clear picture of what is a 
related party transaction at above value, practice shows us that the reality is different. 
Analytically, part of the sponsorship deal involves the development of the ‘Etihad Campus’ 
infrastructures, the space around Manchester City’s stadium. At the end is it expected that it 
will include merchandising developments, an Etihad call centre, a sports science centre, 
coaching facilities and youth training accommodations.98 There is some expenditure that is 
specifically rejected from the relevant expenses concept, as part of the break-even 
calculation.99  
 These exclusions are intentionally created to benefit the clubs and the game, always 
based in a sustainable development ground. In respect of youth development in particular, the 
CL&FFP document states ‘the aim is to encourage investment and expenditure on facilities 
and activities for the long-term benefit of the club’.100 There is a strong analogy between the 
development of the Etihad Campus and the activities deliberately excluded from the relevant 
expenses used for the purposes of the FFP break-even calculation. The specific amount of the 
wealthier Etihad sponsorship money that will be ascribed to the activities excluded from the 
relevant expenses is very difficult to scrutinize and it remains to be seen whether UEFA will 
choose to do so.101 It is widely accepted that reporting these deals may be an extremely hard 
task because to follow the cash trail for this type of sponsorship deal is very difficult, partly 
because Etihad’s accounts do not disclose all the information.  
 Following this rationale, as the FFP regulations grant UEFA broad administration of 
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justice powers102, it should be able to tackle any potential mystification on the matter and 
discover to what extent the sponsorship deals are concluded at a fair value.  
 At its simplest, in situations where the declared fair value of the related party 
transaction is investigated by the UEFA Club Financial Control Body, an impartial third party 
assistant will perform a fair valuation by following standardized market practices and assign a 
fair value to the related party transaction.103 The club may choose an independent third party 
assessor, which has been approved by UEFA. In this case the third party assessor must not be 
subject to any conflict of interest with the club (e.g. contracted with the club in any other 
business). The value assigned by the third party assessor would then be used for the 
calculation of the BE result.104  
 One should may argue that this rule is breaching the principal of equality among the 
clubs and widening, even more, the gap between them through discriminating those who do 
not have possibilities of covering their losses rather than those who keep injecting money 
from their pockets - financial doping - and continue adopting alternative and creative ways to 
comply with the criteria and to pass the BE assessment.  
 These moves were subject to much criticism from the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media, Good 
Governance and Ethics in Sport, which argued that ‘In order to avoid improper transactions of 
this kind, UEFA should prohibit clubs from sponsoring themselves or using associated bodies 
to do so’.105 
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Part II. The evolution of UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Rules 
within European Union law

   35 
1. Sports Special Features 
Today we live within a European dimension so we must reckon with the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. It has, at last, brought sport within the 
explicit scope of the Treaty. Nonetheless, the Treaty of Lisbon has not made any fundamental 
change regarding the previous rules, and it emphatically does not offer any sort of binding or 
comprehensive approach to the topic. One may argue that EU sports law is still an ambiguous 
creature and its shape has been moulded incrementally over many years, long before the rise 
of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
Once sport has an economic dimension, sporting practices may be assessed against the 
broad scope provisions enshrined in TFEU’s. The Treaty contains provisions that exert a 
broad control over the functioning of the whole economy. These include, most significantly, 
the provisions on free movement of persons and services and the rules on competition. In this 
way EU law has overlapped with ‘internal’ sports law and sporting conducts must comply 
with the Treaty. 
Generally speaking, since sport has been perceived as having a financial dimension, 
sporting practices fall within the extent of the Treaty. It encompasses rules that apply an 
expansive control over the working of the global economy. Most essentially, these 
incorporate the free movement of persons and the freedom to provide service provisions and 
the provisions based on European competition law grounds. Subsequently, sporting practices 
must be in accordance with the Commission regulations and this coincides, partly in time, 
with the 'domestic' sports law framework. 
It is the complex and ambiguous confluence between sporting practices and EU law 
that has long stimulated my interest in this field.  There are issues that need to be addressed, 
vis – à – vis how legitimate is the EU’s claim to subject sporting practices to the rules of the 
Treaty given that the TFEU offers no regulation on the scope to which sport’s individual 
specificities should inform the legal analysis as well as in what way are the frequent appeals 
of sports federations to be granted autonomy from legal intervention legitimate, given that 
their decisions frequently carry significant economic implications. 
In fact, recent years have shown that the rapid increase in the commercial significance 
of the sports sector, driven in part by the technological and regulatory reshaping of the 
broadcasting industry, has brought with it even more willingness to scrutinise the role of law 
in influencing the choices available to sports governing bodies. 
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One should consider that EU trade law should not be applied to sport in a way that 
neglects sport’s undoubted special characteristics. For example, clubs in a professional sports 
league are not competitors with the same nature or characteristics found in the common 
markets. Sports clubs need opponents; they need credible rivals to compete against. There is 
an alignment of interdependence among clubs in the same league that is almost cultural. They 
are strictly linked, which marks the organised sport as culturally and economically different, 
distinguishing it autonomously  
Some special features make competitive sport a special case, and the law should 
regard that otherwise will experience justified criticism for insensitive mishandling with the 
matter. Instead, some experts in this subject are reluctant once they could be sceptical to 
assume that sport is quite as special as sports federations sometimes claim it.106 
Namely, they argue that they cannot approve that the simple finding that a practice 
with economic implications is included in the sporting sector is sufficient to entitle its 
immunity from legal device. Claiming favourably to a model that embraces an inevitable 
intersection between the EU provisions and sports corporate governance – that is, a model 
according to which sport is subject to EU law, but that boasts special features that are also 
relevant to the legal analysis. The interest of this question lies in deciding just where to frame 
competitive sport because it is based on a compelling claim for a specific treatment. This 
treatment given by the law recognizes the social and economic special features of sport and 
where, on the contrary, sports bodies are only focused on defending their own interests.  
There is no doubt that sport has its own specificities. The question is to what degree 
EU law and policy apply.107 As a substance of constitutional body enshrined in Article 165 
n.1 of the TFEU and a subject of administrative and judicial procedures until the present day, 
sport is not so singular. In this regard,  
The Nice Declaration on Sport helds that ‘the Community must, in its actions under 
the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural functions 
inherent in sport and making it special’.108 This does not mean that sport is singular and 
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unique under EU law although, as many other sectors (agriculture, transport, inter alia), it has 
its own special features that individualize it among the different industries.  
Reference should be made to three important CJEU (then EEC) rulings that show an 
evolution in the very description and understanding of the sports issues made by the very 
Court itself. These serve to frame many of the considerations and factual analysis and they 
illuminate the confusing tensions involved in the formation of the spirit of law. In Walrave 
and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale, the Court treated the composition of national 
sports teams as not affected by the Treaty’s ban of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
and considered the selection of players to represent a certain international federation is a 
question of purely sporting interest and, as such, has nothing to do with economic activity.  
The outcome was reasonable; there is simply no internationally representative football 
without restrictions on selection policies. Besides, we must note that football clubs are strictly 
connected to the country of origin. As addressed in Part I of this piece of research, following 
national competitions, the top teams are selected to participate in international tournaments. It 
is key that a large number of the clubs’ players derive from their country of origin. The team 
would be less attractive for its supporters if it does not happen. It would be inexplicable, for 
instance, for a team such as Barcelona to be composed exclusively of English and German 
players. If we reach this point, clubs will no longer be affiliated to an area but to a 
company.109 National boundaries may delimit the very nature of the business and, in football, 
they must not be forgotten. They do not constitute simply barriers to trade that impose 
arbitrary isolation on the market but rather a fundamental tool of the structure and popularity 
of the entire football industry.110  
Showing respect for the specificity of sports phenomenon on an industrial scale, the 
Court employed a not very well articulated legal formula. His reference to a matter of interest 
‘purely sporting’ that ‘as such has nothing to do with economic activity’ is unpractical since 
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the selection rules governing international football federations are clearly of sporting 
interest.111 But at the same time, those rules have much to do with economic activity as well. 
1.1. European Union law and policy 
International football is definitely a big-money industry. When, for example, players 
improve their performance and increase visibility and popularity, it also increases clubs’ 
prospects of generating more revenue. Their potential earning depending on the players’ 
international exposure is also another aspect that has implications for the budget. In fact, 
sports and economics fields often overlap - most sporting rules are only in the sphere of 
sporting interest although they also play an economic role. 
What is really in the balance here, is not a set of sporting rules disassociated from a set 
of economic ones. Rather, it is a group of sporting rules, which also carry out economic 
repercussions. Therefore, they must be legally evaluated, but not necessarily convicted under 
the rules of competition. The present research demonstrates that EU legislation and domestic 
law, regarding sporting level, cannot be separated. The Walrave and Koch case presented an 
unsuccessful demand to a separation of the sports field of the economic sphere and, at the 
same time, accepts that competitive sports possesses special features that should be reminded 
in the implementation of the European provisions. Bosman, the second paradigmatic ruling, is 
quite in the same line.112 When referring to the legal issue, the CJEU approached ‘the 
difficulty of severing the economic aspects from the sporting aspects of football’ but, 
somehow, it did not offer a well-defined answer. On one hand, the Court admitted the 
possibility of excluding a 'purely sporting interest' practice from the scope of EU law. But, in 
order to do that, it would have to be proven that a particular national team chose its players 
discriminatorily, based on national grounds.113 
The Court's decision shows that, in general terms, there is significant acceptance for 
the recognition of a certain autonomy that is given to the sports area, free from EU law 
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interference but with the clear awareness that the origin and purpose of these ‘non-economic 
reasons’ are not easy to discern. Once again, in its judgment Bosman, the Court, while 
reluctant to consider the opportunity to comment on what terms the sports practices should be 
justified under European competitive rules, was on the other side ready to identify in which 
terms they should consider their intrinsic characteristics, as in Walrave and Koch. 
It stated that in view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities 
(particularly within the Community), the maintenance of balance between clubs must be an 
objective. To preserve a certain degree of equality and uncertainty of results and encourage 
the recruitment and training of young players are foundations that must be assumed as 
legitimate.114 
However, the Treaty does not offer anything that explicitly point in this direction. 
During that time, it not even intended to mention the specificity of sport. In addition, from the 
time the Lisbon Treaty was implemented, the relevant provision enshrined in Article 165 of 
the TFEU does not provide substantially concrete steps to resolve this kind of dispute. But, 
when the CJEU ruled that specific practices challenged in Bosman clashed with EU law, it 
proved to be available to an interpretation that covers the clear recognition of the specific 
sport features. The Court assumed an interpretation that is, ab initio, qualified to apply to any 
structure under which the worker's freedom to sell workforce on the ending of the contract is 
restricted by arrangements between bosses.115 This shows the impact of the decision, far 
beyond the football sphere. 
The third case study clearly offers a more concrete vision and intellectually more 
reasonable explanation of the relationship between sporting rules and EU legislation. The 
decision of July 2006, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission maintains receptivity in 
considering the theme of the particularities adjacent to sports and the enhancement of EU 
legal aims.116 Regarding the difficulty of detaching the economic aspects from the sporting 
aspects of a sport, the CJEU argued that Community provisions concerning freedom of 
movement for persons and freedom to provide services do not preclude rules or practices 
considered justified on noneconomic grounds which relate to the particular nature and context 
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of certain sports competitions.117 Besides, it has emphasized, that such a restriction on the 
extent of the provisions at stake must remain limited to its proper goal. Consequently, it 
cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the scope of TFEU 
rules. The CJEU argued that ‘the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not 
have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity 
governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down’.118  
In addition, if the sporting activity in question falls within the scope of the Treaty, the 
rules governing this activity must meet its requirements, ‘which, in particular, seek to ensure 
freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services, or 
competition’.119 With this, the notion of ‘purely sporting rule’ is abandoned, that while had 
economic repercussions, was still automatically excluded from the scope of the Treaty. The 
Walrave and Koch misconception is then left behind. The practice can pursue a sporting 
nature - and perhaps even ‘purely sporting’ in the intention - but it must be tested against the 
requirements of the EU antitrust law, when it carries economic effects. But the CJEU did not 
abandon his reasoning, consistent to ensure that the application of EU law bears special 
concerns and, thus, should be considered carefully and with particular legal sensitivity. 
In Meca-Medina the CJEU considered that the overall aim of the rules was the fight 
against doping, with the purpose of competitive sport being considered in a fair and equal 
basis. Indeed, sanctions on the freedom of action of the athletes should be taken as inherent in 
the anti-doping framework. The Court will adopt a conduct where these behaviours are not 
put beyond the scope of judicial review as a matter of principle, but is properly cautious in 
inquiring the practice performed by sports federations in such sensitive areas.  
These are sporting rules – not purely sporting rules – and they are examined under an 
interpretation of EU law, which is sensitive to sport’s special concerns (e.g. to pursue clean 
competition). This piece of research is not intended to defend a model that embraces 
overlaping between EU provisions and internal sports law would solve all problems. These 
rules are examined under an interpretation of EU law that is sensitive to the particularities in 
defining the scope of the special characteristics of sport that embody the expectation of a 
'clean' competition. One may say that Meca-Medina focuses attention in the right direction 
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when suggests that these rules, together with a model that embraces both EU legislation and 
internal sports law, would be extremely helpful.  
The previous established practice, initiated by Walrave and Koch, tends to generate 
little unconstructive arguments about whether the practice is purely sporting in nature and, 
therefore, immune to the possibility of seeing its contents assessed in the light of the existing 
EU competition law, vis-à-vis articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Although taking into account the above considerations, it is better to accept that the 
vast majority of sporting activities have economic implications.   
However, when pretending to apply EU law to them, appropriate respect for the 
particular sporting context in which they are used must be demonstrated. In the Meca-Medina 
judgment, the Court adopted a more extended position. It was implemented a broad view of 
the EU’s antitrust law scope, but having brought sporting rules in light of TFEU, it 
simultaneously shows that is prepared to write about the importance of the issues, but not by 
explicitly adding the described provisions as 'justifications' in the Treaty. It should be noticed 
that this approach is adopted in order to allow the continued application of practices that are 
considered as necessary to implement and achieve the legitimate sporting objectives. The 
Commission also refers to sport’s specific economic aspects in its ENIC v. UEFA 
judgment.120 It argued that provisions prohibiting multiple control of football clubs’ 
ownership repressed demand but, in addition, they were also crucial to sustain a trustworthy 
competition characterized by the uncertainty of the result and so forth.121 
Then, this becomes the core argument when EU law collides with sports governance – 
to which extent those adverse economic effects can be tolerated. As the Court dictated in 
Meca-Medina, the restrictions imposed by rules adopted by sports federations ‘must be 
limited to what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport’.122 
This statement of conditional autonomy of sports federations under EU law, when 
there is an intersection between European law and domestic sports law, is recognized. 
However, within this legal overlaping area123, sports agents have managed to show how and 
why the rules are necessary to accommodate their specific interests - fair play, credible 
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competition, national representative teams, and so on. In Meca-Medina decision, the Court 
shows that the judges will not easily dismiss sports activities.  
1.2. European Union law and the dissociation between pure sporting rules and 
economic rules 
In this piece of research my intention is to refer sport to try to develop a better 
understanding of EU legislation rather than centering sport as the main focus of research. The 
legal dilemma revolves private entities practices that create distortions in the labour market 
(e.g. discrimination on grounds of nationality; restrictions of competition; abuse of dominant 
position, inter alia). They could be dealt with under what is now Article 45 TFEU and in the 
context of what are now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It seems reasonable to adopt this 
position because treated under both provisions, how can someone deal with the clashes 
between different assumptions of competition law and the right to free movement? After all, 
in goods, Article 34 TFEU controls the acts or omissions of public authorities (only), leaving 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to deal with private practices. Following, the labour market 
seems cause for concern due to the "over-regulated" system presented by European legal 
framework.124  
A primary concern is the scope of justification. It was different (and wider) under the 
rules of competition than under the rules of free movement. To defend a separation between 
the two is not the main goal, but instead, it is claimed that the practice of restrictive 
behaviours is an interesting aspect that does not proper fit in the Treaty’s structure and that a 
mixed justification test should be planned.125 Achieving this mixture is, more or less, what the 
Court later on although, so far, it lacks authoritative legal guidance. Revisiting the Meca 
Medina decision, it is best understood in contexts that assume sports bodies’ practices as 
necessary for the organization of the game and consider their specific features as legitimate 
and licit, independently of the EU provision according to which they are assessed.126 
Otherwise, one may consider that the provisions of the Treaty text are not constructive. The 
specific question of discrimination in a football club was a starting point.  
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It allowed inquiry into the extent to which such discrimination can be considered 
necessary in order to support the professional leagues at the national level and, at the same 
time, respect the sport specificities.127 The Court, in Bosman, vigorously approached it, as 
well as the European Commission when stated that ‘each sport has its specificities and 
deserves to be treated differently according to these objectives. The EU will thus not impose 
general rules applicable to all European Sports’128 and this interpretation is somewhat that 
sport federations settle with the Commission.129 The White Paper on Sport focused on some 
of the fundamental foundations of the specificity concept of the sport structure and the 
specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules130 whilst the Commission Staff Working 
Document on Sport and Free Movement of January 2011 argued that ‘the specificity of sport 
cannot be used as an excuse for making a general exception to the application of free 
movement rules to sports activities. Exceptions from EU’s fundamental principles must be 
limited and based on specific circumstances.131 Last but not least, specificity of sport has been 
included in Article 165 TFEU and there is an indication that after the Lisbon Treaty 
adjustments entered into force, the idea might have gained some extra importance within the 
framework of familiar examinations.132 
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2. CL&FFP potential legal challanges within EU law 
The principle legal concerns that UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations presents under EU law 
are that it restricts free movement of workers and that it constitutes an anti-competitive 
agreement. As FFP mechanism has the potential to impinge upon clubs’ economic behaviour, 
one must assess the potential engagement of Article 101 TFEU once it may impact upon the 
movement of players between clubs and determine whether there is a breach of Article 45 
TFEU; and if Article 101 or Article 45 would normally be engaged in such circumstances, 
one must consider whether this would be vitiated by the principle of the specificity of sport 
(or ‘the sporting exception’, as it is also known).  
The point that the CL&FFP regulations generate negative externalities, specially but 
not solely for workers and consumers, links it to the examination of EU law, predominantly 
under antitrust provisions, but possibly also on behalf of the provisions on free movement of 
workers. Moreover, several experts in the field have pointed out the likelihood of such a 
dispute, due to the competition horizontal and vertical restraints that the CL&FFP rules would 
involve.133 This may have influence under the CAS jurisdiction (and, then, by the Swiss 
Federal Court), which would have legitimacy to assess cases implicating the CL&FFP 
regulations. The UEFA has declared that it is operating side by side with the EC regarding the 
CL&FFP rules. Nevertheless, it is known - at the latest because of the Bosman case - that 
such collaboration is no invincible guarantee against the CL&FFP regulations infringing EU 
law. Perhaps there won’t be anyone to defy the CL&FFP regulations, as the different football 
participants seem to have accepted them and the EC’s position supports them. However, there 
is a demand to consider completely the compatibility of the CL&FFP regulations with EU 
law.134  
Considering that no overall exception for sporting rules from EU legal framework 
would be accessible, and that CL&FFP regulations are likely to impact a restriction on the 
free movement of athletes - by the ‘salary cap’ it designs – and restriction of competition as 
well. The main issue is that of their justifiability: separately from the reasonably limited 
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justifications stipulated by Article 101(3) of the TFEU, a rule characterised by restrictively 
effecting competition might be admissible only if those are intrinsic to the lawful objectives 
chased and do not go further what is needed to attain it. 
Firstly, is it pointed out that UEFA implemented a legal instrument that restricts 
competition in the players’ market options and imposes the decrease of salaries’ weight in the 
budget – like a US salary cap – but deprived of compensation via earnings from increased 
competitive balance.135  Secondly, that UEFA held provisions that sacrifice potential welfares 
arising from equity injections from wealthy owners136, also know as ‘sugar daddies’ into 
football accounts.137 Lastly, it is also mentioned that UEFA issued a guideline that will 
‘fossilize’138 or ‘petrify’139 the hierarchy of European football, creating a barrier to entry.140 It 
is the purpose of this piece of research to address namely the second one, with the others 
being subadjacently considered. 
2.1. The problem with the salary cap 
General sports leagues around the globe are those in which participating clubs 
compete among themselves to win the respective tournaments and, following Stephen Ross 
rationale, 'to sign players, subject to rules imposed by the league or agreed among 
themselves'. 141 
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The traditional approach imposed in different leagues - European and beyond - is the 
wage restraint of athletes, a mechanism that can be implemented in several ways, across 
different sports and in many jurisdictions. A 'club salary cap' translates into maximum cash 
limit imposing what a certain club can spend, collectively, in the salaries of their athletes.142 
The limit may also be set for all the clubs in the same competition or may be provided in 
accordance with some criteria, vis-à-vis the percentage of a team’s revenue, being designated 
as ‘team salary cap’.143  Salary caps can be designed in a number of different ways as we can 
also find 'player salary caps' that determines the maximum amount that is allow to be paid to a 
particular athlete, which often varies according to some aspects such as the number of years 
of service or the wage he was receiving formerly or combinations of the two.144 Alternative 
division can be designed amid 'soft caps’ - that teams may exceed regarding determined 
criteria (e.g. to keep a player that has been with the team for a long time) and ‘hard caps’ - 
that teams can never exceed.145 
‘Salary caps’ are distinct from ‘luxury taxes’ or ‘surcharges on sport teams' aggregate 
pay roll in excess of a predetermined limit’.146 However, both seek to curb excessive spending 
since the imposition of a luxury tax creates an incentive for teams to keep salaries below the 
defined level.  
Distinctions aside, all have a common goal that passes by decreasing the level of 
expenditure of the clubs. In this sense, they are as incentives for the teams keep their spending 
on wages below the value set by the 'salary cap'. This proper feature is also real in UEFA’s 
CL&FFP regulations, which operate in a very similar conduct. 
The starter of salary caps in European soccer has had major repercussions on 
European sports and its lawfulness may be tested due to the considerable amount of money 
involved. When UEFA’s CL&FFP provisions became applicable in 2012, salary caps were 
                                                 
142
 Id., p.50. 
143
 Helmut Dietl and others "Welfare Effects of Salary Caps in Sports Leagues with Win-Maximizing Clubs", Working Paper No 08-25, 
Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich, 2008, pp. 3-4. Cf. also, e.g., the ‘NHL has a $59.4 million team salary 
cap and a $11.88 million player salary cap’ by Squeet in “Salary/Payroll Cap the Most Complicated Thing in the NHL”, LEAFSPACE (Aug. 
2010), retrieved from: http://media.fans.mapleleafs.nhl.com/_8-SalaryPayroll-Cap-the-most-Complicated-thing-in-the- 
nhl/blog/2519175/122856.html. 
144
 Stephen Ross, above nº134, p.50. 
145
 Lindholm, J., 2011. “The Problem With Salary Caps Under European Union Law: The Case Against Financial Fair Play”, Texas Review 
of Entertainment & Sports Law, 12(2), pp.193-194. 
146
 Helmut Dietl et al., “The Effect of Luxury Taxes on Competitive Balance, Club Profits, and Social Welfare in Sports Leagues”, Inst. for 
Strategy and Business and Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 91, 2009, pp. 2-20. 
   47 
are already an important feature of European football industry, with clubs constantly learning 
cap management.147 
The CL&FFP regulations pointed out, ab initio, many doubts as to its compatibility 
with the rules of competition enshrined in European legislation. Of note, several North 
American experts in this field have argued that restrictive measures such as 'salary caps', used 
in professional sports, are considered anti-competitive in nature and, therefore, breach the law 
of the country.148 
It should be noticed that E.U. competition law as U.S. antitrust law pursues to 
eradicate anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant positions within the different 
Member-States.149 
The main legal provision enshrined in UEFA CL&FFP regulations is the so-called 
break-even requirement. This BE requirement is a type of ‘salary cap’ similarly to a 
previously measure enacted by UEFA, in an attempt to restore European football finances. A 
‘salary cap’ was a comparatively distant conception to European football, notwithstanding 
their practice in other sporting competitions.150 This perception improved when the 
enforcement of the CL&FFP regulations. The nearest European professional football clubs 
had come to applying a ‘salary cap’ mechanism was the G-14 group. In 2003, the organisation 
composed by the Europe’s 14 most prosperous football clubs, entered into a resolution 
according to which the clubs accepted to ‘limit their salary expenditures to 70% of their 
turnover starting in the 2005-06 season’. 151 
Nevertheless, this measure was never successfully implemented and the clubs failed to 
conform to the limit. The exact cause of the breakdown is up for discussion, with some 
analysts indicating that it was probably due to the deficiency of the mechanism’s 
enforcement, while others suggest it was never really placed.152 Resembling the G-14 cap, the 
BE requirement is a ‘relative salary cap’, meaning, as mentioned before, that the capped 
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amount is different for each club. This distinguishes it from the more common "absolute 
salary cap’.153  
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2.1.1 The main purpose of a ‘salary cap’ 
‘Salary caps’ are constantly striving towards the purpose of achieving ‘competitive 
balance.154 Those who support such measures subscribe to the theory that financial 
differences between teams translate into competitive differences, and that rules must be 
enacted to ensure that small and large market teams have equal possibilities to compete.155  
The major proponents of this budget constraint measure are also reasoning that major 
budgetary differences between clubs create a greater gap between them. It also increases the 
competitive imbalances, leaving some clubs with greater ability to attract investment and in a 
more privileged position than others. Therefore, these rules should be implemented to ensure 
that all teams have access to the same market opportunities. 
Regardless of what its main purpose was, the current rules of CL&FFP issued by 
UEFA, did not intend, in some authors’ opinions, to promote better competitive balance.156 
According to the upper European football governing body, the CL&FFP regulations do not 
aim to determine a 'level playing field but only a certain minimum level’.157  
These considerations, however, may be problematic. While an 'absolut salary cap' can 
effectively improve the competitive balance - giving the teams the opportunity to compete in 
equal conditions - a 'relative salary cap' similar to the CL&FFP rules will further complicate 
the task of those clubs, which have less capacity to attract investment, when competing 
against the most powerful teams in European football.158 In this sense, if one consents that 
there is a link concerning a club's financial status and its achievement in sports competitions 
the CL&FFP regulations will make it tougher for less prosperous teams to play with 
conventionally solid teams. 
As a rule, these clubs of smaller dimension generate less revenue and, therefore, they 
resort more often to capital investment to develop. Some experts in the field have already 
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studied this matter. Kenesse, in particular, concluded a study regarding a 'salary cap' very 
similar to the one enshrined in CL&FFP regulations and argued that such measures would 
degrade, even more, the level of competitive balance of clubs, regardless of whether they are 
primarily related to profit-seekers or win-seekers.159 
The CL system was held by UEFA as a need to guarantee the integrity of competitions 
and especially to safeguard the continuity of international competitions for one season.160 
Following, the EC had already stated why this is so significant when argued that one needs to 
consider the side effects that may arise from a possible bankruptcy situation of one or more 
clubs pending the season161, to be aware of the theme’s substance. At the same time, 
emphasized that the principal goal of the CL system is to ensure that the integrity of 
competitions is fulfilled, avoiding sudden insolvency panoramas during the season that distort 
them. These sorts of effects are inevitably bad for the proper clubs as the calendar of 
competitions is changed, the remaining clubs in the same competition will also be affected 
and a legal nebulous area might begin (e.g. regarding broadcasting rights and other forms of 
financing). 162 
This aspect has not been openly stated with regard to the FFP rules, but likely operates 
correspondingly because the BE requirement is strictly connected to the CL system.  
Combining both, we see that CL&FFP regulations ‘seek to achieve long-term financial 
sustainability and thereby ensure the long-term viability of European football’.163 
2.2. A mention to the third-party ownership issue 
Recently, the former FIFA President Joseph Sepp Blatter announced that third parties 
would be forbidden to arrest the economic rights of football players – Third-Party Ownership. 
First of all, one should distinguish between economic rights and federative rights of athletes. 
The federative rights are those originated from the assignment of the right to register a player 
from one club to another and the economic rights refer to the income derived from the transfer 
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of a player from one club to another. With this decision of the upper world football governing 
body, a debate on the TPO will probably be over, but not with all its major issues dispelled. 
164
 
It is general knowledge that the labour market in football is mostly open, where 
players can easily be transferred during the transfer periods prescribed for that purpose. Given 
the unpredictable loans and last minute megalomaniac transfers, the football labour market is 
a constant source of fantastic episodes for millions of fans who intensively follow the market 
days.  
What to say, then, about the capital market; it must be assessed whether capital move 
easily within the football industry. In some countries, the answer is affirmative, particularly in 
England, where it is a real possibility, since the necessary money is available. In the last 
decade, famous European football clubs like Chelsea, Manchester City or even Manchester 
United were bought. Other countries, like France, have also begun to follow this trend. Once 
it is so easy to buy equity in a club, the investors do not need to buy the economic rights of 
the players. 
On the other hand, countries such as Portugal and Spain have a clearly distinct reality. 
Traditional clubs like FC Porto, Benfica, Real Madrid or Barcelona maintain the tradition of 
being run by their own members and they do not seem very receptive to the idea of being 
acquired by outsider billionaires from Russia, Qatar, U.A.E and so forth. These clubs thus 
have a diametrically opposed financing model. It was in that moment that TPO’s were 
implemented, with them being crucial in these types of clubs funding, in recent decades. They 
financed the club by buying the economic rights of the players, but not the clubs, getting the 
money for the football industry but through another vehicle. Sometimes, theis means of 
financing originated conflicts with clubs and even coaches. But, overall, they still are a very 
effective way to finance clubs. If a TPO buys the economic rights of a player (or part thereof), 
in association with a football club, it enables football clubs to acquire the best players and, 
therefore, be more competitive. The variety of TPO circumstances derives from its contractual 
basis. The parties are free under domestic private law to ingeniously draft those contracts as 
they see appropriate, each one of them being a particular kind of TPO in itself.165 
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There are risks for both the club and for TPOs, but they will always exist, because the 
ownership of the economic rights of a player is not directly related to its sporting 
performance. However, it is clear that if a player is very good, and the club is able to increase 
its market value within one or two years, the player will then be sold to an inserted larger club 
in a more affluent market, with benefits to be shared between the club and its TPOs. In the 
case of Portugal, clubs like FC Porto and Sport Lisboa Benfica have proved as an excellent 
investment for the TPO's, which helped transform these clubs into 'talent centres', allowing 
the reveal of many players to European football and sale of the best to the major clubs within 
the industry. Without the capital provided by the TPO's excellent asset export performance of 
these two clubs, it would have been much more difficult and almost unlikely their presence 
among the eight best teams in the UEFA Champions League 2014. 
The TPO’s allow clubs to include players sometimes too expensive for their budgets. 
So both profit from the situation. The club improves with better players; the players evolve 
and are eventually transferred to other clubs, by much higher value. As there is more revenue, 
all parties win. If the imported player eventually proved not to be such a good investment, the 
costs in such cases are supported not only by the clubs, but are also shared with the TPO's. It 
can be said that the TPO's are strategic partners for this type of clubs because they can 
provide additional capital, which has been efficiently used in most cases. For these, the TPO's 
were clearly a competitive advantage, and this was probably the reason that led the English 
clubs and others to protest against this reality. 
Some figures related to the industry, in particular, President Michel Platini, argued 
that there are transparency issues related to TPO's because their owners are not known, or 
because it is entering illegal money in the world of sport.166 
But many financial institutions or investment funds that are very active on capital 
markets have the same features. What is the difference? Probably there should exist a FIFA 
record for the TPO's - such transparency might permit the football governing bodies to search 
any possible conflicts of interest between, e.g., those who possess a stake in a football club 
and those who also possess the economic rights of a football player - but to me, it is not 
sufficient to change the industry’s economy. The fundamental issue is that the football 
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industry is a financially very attractive business, generating millions in revenue. So, it is 
expectable that investors enjoy this type of business. In markets where they cannot easily 
acquire control of the clubs, investors start to buy players, making money continues to 
circulate and making possible for many clubs achieve higher performance levels.167 
Unfortunately for some cubes, like the Portuguese and Spanish ones, FIFA and UEFA 
do not seem to share these ideas, and former FIFA President (Mr Blatter), announced its 
prohibition by a brief adjustment period. It must now try to interpret how the clubs will be 
able to adapt to the new reality. A possible answer to this question will invite the TPO's to 
directly invest in the clubs, becoming shareholders. Another solution is the TPO's become like 
the investment banks and lend money directly to clubs to finance the players’ transfers. 
Whatever could be the solution, money will arrange a way to continue its flow. However, in 
this relationship called Third Party Ownership, an important limitation is apparent from 
proper FIFA regulations. Article 18bis of the RSTP plays an important role in this issue by 
prohibiting that the third party has influence on written contracts between clubs and 
players.168 FIFA nonetheless discovered that Article 18bis is deficient for attaining its 
intended purposes and on December 19, 2014, it presented a new ruling to the RSTP.169 The 
new provision, Article 18ter, which incorporation occurred on May 1, 2015, encompasses a 
total and unconditional ban on third-party ownership. It held: 
 
‘No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a third 
party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable in 
relation to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any 
rights in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation.’ 
 
This provision, which can be referred to as FIFA’s TPO ban, is enforced by 
disciplinary measures. The measure is mandatory at national level and all national football 
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associations must include it, without modification, in their national regulations.170 It should be 
noted, however, that even before the FIFA’s ban, some national bodies - for example the EPL 
– have already implemented similar requirements.171 
Following these articles result, two hypotheses have been trailed: the hypothesis 
pursued by France, England and Poland - who share the opinion that making a restrictive 
interpretation of the ruling fully prevent the economic sharing of players’ rights - and the 
permissive hypothesis, but without violating the prerequisites of the mentioned items. One 
might refer, as before mentioned, to countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy and South America172 
that will make their teams more competitive due to the possibility of using this type of 
investment. It is my belief, therefore, that the option will have to be progressively 
implemented, allowing the competitive realities not to be abruptly changed and, thus, giving 
time for sporting businesses have an adjustment period vis-à-vis the squads of professional 
teams, the financial strategy and its survey network of young athletes. Instead, if the decision-
makers opt for an immediate ban, and as stated by Emanuel Macedo Medeiros, it would be ‘a 
clash of biblical dimensions and would adversely condition the clubs where such practices 
exist’.173  
It is well known that procedures governing sporting practices fall under the TFEU 
scope in so far as they engage in ’economic activity’. The CJEU has constantly said, in a large 
number of cases, that semi-professional and professional sport, in general, and football, in 
specific, comprises ‘an economic activity’ to which the Treaties apply.174 The EC has, in fact, 
specifically and explicitly pointed out that ‘the transfer of players in exchange for transfer 
fees comprises an economic activity’.175 Therefore, it is precise that the activities threatened 
by FIFA’s TPO ban, like the allocation of transfer payments and player transfers, as such, fall 
under the extent of the TFEU provisions.  
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More complex issues are whether specific provisions of the Treaty apply to FIFA and 
whether those provisions cover the TPO ban. Likewise CL&FFP regulations, TPO’s 
agreements ban involve a lot of concerns regarding EU competition law, where three distinct 
EU legal foundations might be used to contest it. These three grounds may vary regarding 
which interested parties can raise claims pursuant to them. At first glance, third-party 
shareholders and clubs can and are expected to argue that the TPO ban restricts their freedom 
to do and pursue investments respectively, as guaranteed under the free movement of 
capital.176 Secondly, football clubs and possibly players can claim that the TPO ban is 
breaching EU competition law since it obstructs intra-club rivalry on the player market.177 
Last but not least, TPO’s shareholders can claim that FIFA, through the ban imposition, has 
abused its market position in order to exclude them from the player transfer market.178 
Concerning CL&FFP regulations there are two particular modifications to the criteria 
launched by UEFA in 2012. These include the provisions set in Annex VI (E)(m)(ii)179 and 
Annex VII (C)(5)(b).180 The initial one incorporates a disclosure requirement in respect of 
Third-Party Ownership and the latter incorporates a minimum accounting requirement in 
respect of a disposal of rights to a TPO. Interestingly, Annex VII, (C)(5)(b) appears to rule 
out a club to take advantage of selling part of a current players’ economic rights for a 
payment and using that as additional revenue to BE. Note that such revenues can only be 
accounted for once the full and permanent transfer of the player has occurred. It appears that 
the single TPO approach available is when buying an athlete. That is because there is nothing 
in the latest set of licensing provisions which defines that a third party investor cannot buy, 
for example, 99% of the economic rights of a player with the club subsidising only 1%. This 
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could result in that team only having to account 1%, for the worth of expenditure, in their 
CL&FFP submission. 
Despite a first flash at a triumph in the CL&FFP case versus UEFA, with the Court of 
Brussels (first instance) asking for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, this has proven to be an 
illusion. The CJEU declined to answer the issues of the Brussels Court while the provisory 
measures demanded by the judge were suspended, following a UEFA’s appeal.181 
Nevertheless, the supra case regarding FIFA’s TPO ban, also implicating UEFA and the 
Belgium federation, was expected to be addressed in front of the same Brussels Court, which 
had demonstrated to be very disposed in preventing UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations. However, 
the final decision constituted good news for FIFA and another disappointment to the 
contestants. 
The prospect of a suitable Bosman bis repetita is vanishing. In addition, the judgment 
of the Brussels Court aroused a lot of curiosity and it is definitely of relevance to all those 
who are keenly expecting to know whether FIFA’s TPO ban will be considered well-suited, 
or not, with EU law.182 
3. CL&FFP legal dispute 
A famous players’ agent - Mr Daniel Striani and others - who sued the rules of 
financial fair play imposed by UEFA to clubs, prepared the first legal challenge. Then, on 29 
May 2015, the Brussels Court of First Instance publicised its earlier position on the matter. 
Various media conveyed the decision as an initial inclination to the victory of those who do 
not support the regulations.183 The Brussels Court not only imposed internal measures 
inhibiting the implementation of the second stage of CL&FFP regulations - which aims to 
further limit the possibility of debt capacity performed by the clubs, by reducing the 
'maximum permitted deficit’ - but also made a reference of the dispute to the CJEU, for a 
preliminary ruling. However, a careful legal interpretation of the before mentioned judgment, 
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does challenge the widespread expectation of seeing the rules of CL&FFP evaluated under the 
EU legislation.  
  58 
3.1. A potential legal fiction and the Brussels’ Court Judgment 
It all started when, in its decision, the Brussels Court stated that since the case at stake 
did not belong to the scope of its jurisdiction, declared incompetent to review the complaint 
lodged by the famous players' agent, Mr Daniel Striani, against the CL&FFP regulations. As 
UEFA had challenged the ‘jurisdiction matter’ pending the action, the Court had to assess 
whether the relevant international jurisdiction criteria were satisfied. In this case, it should be 
noted that when a dispute of European competition law is brought against an undertaking that 
is located in Switzerland, the jurisdiction regarding the courts of the various member states is 
assessed according to the Lugano II Convention, on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters.184 
The major legal foundation is enshrined in Article 2 of the LC and states that the 
defendant should be prosecuted where it is domiciled. Since the CL&FFP regulations 
constitute a legal and financial mechanism issued by UEFA, the location of the event which 
gives rise to the dispute must be considered to be in Switzerland. Accordingly, in principle, 
the Swiss courts are the only ones empowered to deal with this cause of appeal and to reverse 
the inconvenience caused by the alleged anti-competitive nature of CL&FFP regulations. 
However, we can identify a way of exception from Article 5º nº3 LC, which gives 
special territorial jurisdiction to the courts where 'the harmful event occurred or may occur’. 
This encompasses two different places - where the damage occurred - Belgium - and the place 
of the origin event - Switzerland.185  
The article encompasses that the perpetrator ought be prosecuted, depending on the 
applicant’s willingness, in the courts of any of these locations. Revisiting previous case law, 
this special prerogative in the jurisdiction choice requires the existence of particularly 
connecting factors between the dispute and the courts domiciled where the damage occurred, 
or may occur.186 
Moreover, the Brussels Court of first instance did not have the same opinion as UEFA, 
which argued that the injuries presented by Mr Daniel Striani, were hypothetical and purely 
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speculative.187 However, at the same time, it held that negative externalities are only an 
indirect consequence for those clubs who wish to join in European competitions, since neither 
the players nor the players’ agents were directly affected by the rules. They could only be 
affected by indirect repercussions (players) and for very indirect damages (players’ agents): 
’neither the players nor the players’ agents are addresses of the FFP. Subsequently, players 
could only suffer indirect harm and agents only ‘very indirect’ harm’.188 
Using other terminology, since the CL&FFP regulations not directly affect Mr Daniel 
Striani, he lacks legitimacy to raise the issue of possible violation of EU competition law 
standards, before several Member States’ courts.189  This restrictive interpretation of the 
provision enshrined in Article 5º nº3 of the LC is in line with the CJEU legal doctrine.190 In 
addition, the Court did not address the rest of the arguments of the other claimants who joined 
Mr Striani in the proceedings. 
Despite identifying the Swiss courts as the only ones competent to assess the content 
of the dispute, the Brussels Court acceded to Striani’s request when it asked for provisional 
measures, vis-à-vis preventing UEFA’s implementation of the second stage of the FFP 
mechanism.191  
Somehow remarkably, the Court made reference to Article 31º of the LC for this 
objective, which held that: 
 
‘The application may be made to the courts of a State bound by (the Lugano) 
Convention for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under 
the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts of another State bound by this 
Convention have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter’.192  
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The Court gave no explanation regarding neither the urgency of the facts, nor the 
necessity to assure that the statutory foundations laid down by Striani justified the application 
of the provisional measures, whose geographic area is circumscribe to the Belgian territory.193 
The Brussels Court deliberated and a reference to a preliminary ruling was made to the 
CJEU consider. This reference of the case was another of Striani’s claims at the start of the 
process and fundamentally questioned whether the CL&FFP rules, vis-à-vis its break-even 
requirement, violated European rules laid down in TFEU Articles 45, 56, 63, 101, 102.194  
Therefore, the decision of the Court did not culminate in a failed attempt performed by 
Mr Daniel Striani. However, this victory seems to be just a merely pyrrhic one195, given that 
UEFA has already appealed against the decision, which automatically suspends its effects: the 
interim measures and the preliminary ruling reference. UEFA may then proceed with the 
implementation of the second stage of the rules, as planned. It also seems implausible that the 
Brussels Court of Appeals would support the first instance decision.  
Firstly, it seems inappropriate to invoke Article 31 LC to make the case for a 
preliminary ruling regarding the content of the provision and, in addition, by a court that does 
not even have jurisdiction to do so. Allegedly, it could be materialized in a violation of the 
objectives pursued by the LC. Secondly, the possibility of being declared provisional 
measures, based on Article 31 LC, is subject to a verification of a legal assumption - the 
existence of a causal link between the content of the measure and the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court that adopted the decision.196 One may expect the Court will improve its justification. 
Otherwise, it contradicts itself following that it had already realised that the specific linking 
factors to take jurisdiction on the matter were missing.197 
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3.2. The European Commission: back on track? 
The judgment of the Brussels Court puts the European Commission in an awkward 
position. Evidently, the Court was incapable of adequately protecting the rights of the 
complainant, as the Commission had argued when rejecting the complaint. If Mr Striani 
wanted to re-submit his complaint, it would be difficult for the Commission to argue once 
again that there is insufficient Union interest to conduct an investigation. 
One may share the reasoning that the Brussels judgment put the EC in a difficult 
balancing position. If Striani wants to resubmit the complaint, the perspective is that it would 
be very difficult for the Commission to argue, once again, in the direction of no greater 
substance within EU’s legislation to continue with the proceedings but the fact that the EC 
have failed to mention this last statutory provision may prove useful, if the Court would reject 
it for a second time. Instead, it still could argue that Striani lacks legitimate interest, as he is 
not directly affected by the alleged infringement. 
In any case, it should be noted that it is not expected a consistent assessment of the 
CL&FFP regulations within the European Commission's status - a decision that needed to be 
a concise and imposing appraisal. The EC had constantly repeated its political support 
regarding the underlying legal foundations enshrined in UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations. 
Indeed, in 2009, the Commission organized a conference related to this hot topic and three 
years later, then Commissioner for Competition Almunia, released a joint statement with 
UEFA president Michel Platini, emphasizing the idea that the CL&FFP regulations 
are ‘consistent with the aims and objectives of European Union policy in the field of State 
Aid.198   
In the interim, other civil litigation had been raised, with a group of Paris Saint-
Germain supporters also challenging the CL&FFP regulations (in a French court, where any 
hearing has been yet listed for these proceedings).199 The fans are reportedly suing the French 
football federation and the league ‘to denounce the multiple infringements of European Union 
law caused by the UEFA break-even requirement’.200 
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To conclude, in spite of the ambiguous declarations, carefully written to jeopardize a 
suitable legal evaluation, the removal of the EC’s backing would have been diplomatically 
uncomfortable. The probable result of the pending litigation is a continuing diplomatic 
commitment whereby UEFA adapts the regulations whether through improvements to the 
CL&FFP regulations themselves, or to their implementation. It should be noticed that this 
steps had already started when, following to the Brussels Court decision, on June 30th, UEFA 
proclaimed that its Executive Committee had ratified the 2015-18 UEFA CL&FFP 
Regulations. The improved regulations were drafted as an outcome of the discussion with the 
European Club Association through a dedicated UEFA-ECA working group, having present 
that ‘the court’s ruling post-dated by over four months the two days of submissions and legal 
argument made to the court in February, allowing time for UEFA to prepare a considered 
response’.201 UEFA president Michel Platini, added that the amended regulations sustain the 
opportunity for football clubs to transfer from ‘austerity to sustainable growth’, by consenting 
European clubs to take UEFA’s approval for a entitled “voluntary settlement” in which they 
would be permitted to move beyond the rigorous boundaries of the BE rule.202 In addition, the 
adjustments and concessions would be applicable for clubs in countries where the market is 
considered to be structurally and economically deficient.203 
I do not sympathize with the conclusion regarding the earlier decision of the 
Commission in this case. The anticipated reference for a preliminary ruling does not mean 
that the European Commission's position is affected in any way.  Adequate jurisdictional 
protection does not necessarily imply that the national court must deal with the matter on its 
own.  On the contrary, should the interpretation of EU law be necessary for the ruling, the 
CJUE has to get involved. 
  
                                                 
201
 Tom Serby of Anglia Ruskin University Law School, Cambridge, United Kingdom, “UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations: Brussels 
court refers the Striani complaint brought by Advocate Jean-Louis Dupont to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling and 
imposes interim embargo on phase 2 of the Regulations”, The International Resource to the Taxation of Sportsmen and Sportswomen, in 
Free, Sports and Taxation, available at: http://www.sportsandtaxation.com (1, Jul 2015). 
202
 Rob Harris, “UEFA relaxes Financial Fair Play rules as president Michel Platini aims to increase investment in European clubs”, 
retrieved from: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-3144154/Michel-Platini-launches-tougher-Financial-Fair-Play-rules-UEFA-
President-hopes-attract-investment-European clubs.html#ixzz43qbZQqda (first published: 30 June 2015 and last updated: 30, June 2015). Cf. 
also, Sport Business International, “Uefa eases FFP regulations”, available at: http://www.sportbusiness.com/sport-news/uefa-eases-ffp-
regulations (30, June 2015). 
203
 Id. 
   63 
4. Brief mention of Article 45 TFEU 
Concerning TFEU’s Article 45 it is written that workers must have freedom of 
movement within the European Union and that any agreement restricting their movement 
ought to be deemed void but, in addition, subject to certain limitations not applicable to our 
case.204 According to the judgment in Bosman, ‘provisions which preclude or deter a national 
of a Member State from leaving his country of origin to exercise their right to freedom of 
movement (...) constitute an obstacle to that freedom’.205 The CJEU has confirmed on several 
occasions that ‘professional sportsmen and semi-professionals are workers’.206 Following this 
reasoning, any barrier to their movement is, as a general rule, considered void, except if 
vindicated by a lawful aim, as long as intrinsic and proportionate207 to that legitimate aim, 
under the aegis of European law grounds. 
Revisiting some relevant case law, we perceive by CJEU’s decisions that it is implicit 
that particular barriers may be suitable where such a measure ‘is objectively justified’ and, in 
addition, if it does not ‘go beyond what is necessary’ for achieving the pursued objective.208 
The Court held that any rules that are likely to affect a freedom guaranteed by EU provisions 
needed to be cumulatively justified vis-à-vis by an objective of imperative requirements 
regarding the general public interest; suitable for achieving that objective; and accordingly 
proportionate.209 In ‘Gebhard v. Consiglio Dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Mi’, it 
remained an empirical question to answer as to whether the enforcement of CL&FFP 
mechanism would, in fact, limit free movement of workers.   
Observes, therefore, to assess the compatibility of the CL&FFP rules in relation to 
European legislation and analyse whether the rules imposed by UEFA to clubs prohibit or 
condition, in any way, the free movement of workers. According to some experts in the field, 
it seems incoherent to assert that the possibility of banning the clubs to submit negative 
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balance sheets in the long term restricts the free movement of workers more than a 
multinational company, when opting to adjust barriers on workers’ movement.210  
In addition, salary caps make it more challenging for professional athletes to transfer 
from one club to another due to salary caps and the presence of cap space as a requirement for 
employment (the difference between a club’s actual payroll and the amount introduced by the 
salary cap mechanism). A club will be incapable of employing an athlete that is a free agent 
or whose team is disposed to exchange him or her, if that club has too little cap space.211  
Salary caps may have an impact in player’s movement, since this prerequisite did not 
formerly exist. For instance, assuming that Club X settles the transfer of Player Y to Club Z. 
However, because of the enforcement of a salary cap, the transfer is not longer permitted 
except Club Z can draft enough cap space. The principal means for Club Z to create 
additional cap space is to trade players presently under deal along with their wages. Player Y 
hired by Club Z thus becomes controlled by the cap space of Club X and other clubs, by the 
willingness of such clubs to transfer and sign in players, and, in some contexts, the interest of 
those players to be merchandise. That salary caps obstruct player movement reflects that 
many sporting activities implemented salary caps to lessen wage inflation that was perceived 
as linked to high-class player movement (e.g. throughout the institution of free agency).212 
The NBA offers a paradigm of in what way a salary cap may considerably have an impact in 
player’s movement. The probability and accessibility of making cap space has turned a 
critical factor for where athletes work.213  
This regulates clubs' schedules and numerous prearranged transfers have been stopped 
because of the institution of the salary cap, since the team that was alleged to purchase the 
player had deficient cap space.214 Ultimately, practices in the NFL demonstrate that athletes 
with high salaries are more touched by the mechanism.215  
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That a salary cap obstructs player movement is important in U.S. regulations as part of 
competition scrutiny.216 Nonetheless, under E.U. law the impact on free movement establishes 
an impartial legal basis for questioning the legality of salary caps under Article 45 of the 
TFEU. The Court has also determined that Article 45 relates not only to public authorities 
acts, but also to movements by and among organizations and other remote entities if they run 
‘gainful employment in a collective manner’.217 This comprises rules announced by sporting 
bodies.218 Therefore, it is recognisable that Article 45 is related to the CL&FFP regulations 
and the pertinent legal issue turn out to be whether the regulations breach the freedom of 
movement for workers.  The rules do not discriminate, straightforwardly or indirectly, on 
nationality grounds,219 but that does not express that they are tolerable. Following the CJEU 
rationale, ‘Provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his 
country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement (...) constitute an 
obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers 
concerned’.220 
Operating this examination in Bernard and in Bosman, the CJEU found that sporting 
provisions, turning employment of football athletes restricted upon the compensation of 
"training fees", constituted such a difficulty.221Additionally, in Lehtonen case, the CJEU 
established that regulations, restraining when basketball athletes might switch clubs, 
obstructed the free movement of workers’.222 Revisiting this case law, the CL&FFP 
regulations ‘preclude or deter’ player movement to such a degree that it creates an illegitimate 
barrier to the freedom of movement of workers. Article 45 does not relate to domestic 
situations, implying that barriers to workers' movement inside a Member State do not fall 
within the scope of the ruling.223 Nevertheless, the fact that the CL&FFP regulations operate 
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equally to trades of athletes between teams within the same Member State may be seen as 
inappropriate.  
Whereas a challenge of the provisions should be grounded on their outcome on 
athletes’ movement between teams in diverse Member States, the provisions are designed in 
such a way that their effects on movement might not be restricted to domestic situations224. 
5. Introduction to Article 101 TFEU 
Any entity engaged in an economic activity is categorised as an undertaking, for the 
purposes of Article 101 and 102.225 Article 101 TFEU encompasses an essencial device for 
monitoring anti-competitive dealings by cartels with the EU and it is directly applicable - it 
comprises a system of self-assessment in which the actors must know if they are in 
compliance with the rules. The legal provisions in this ruling are set forth in three disctintive 
clauses. The provision clause is set in paragraph 1; the nullity clause226 in paragraph 2, and 
the exemption clause in paragraph 3 of the article. 
In the sporting framework, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU stipulated that the sporting 
activities in issue fall under the scope of the Treaty, meaning that the provisions which 
control the conditions for entering in sports business sector need to comply with the criteria 
set in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
It has been assumed that domestic and international sporting associations, the teams 
that integrate them and independent players, can be considered to be ‘undertakings’.227 
Sporting federations can also be considered as an ‘association of undertakings’228 or an 
‘association of associations of undertakings’.229 Their provisions might constitute ‘agreements 
or decisions,’230 which could cause distortions of competition inside the relevant markets and 
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disturb trade among Member States.231 Nonetheless, Article 102 TFEU does not include the 
notion of ‘association of undertakings’ but affects the unilateral behaviours of dominant 
‘undertakings’. The CJEU has assumed that even though a sports federation like FIFA is not 
itself dynamic on a certain market, it could constitute an ‘undertaking’ regarding Article 102 
TFEU to the point that it symbolises the willingness of its associates that are active on that 
market.232 Moreover, when they involve themselves in economic activity, a monopolistic 
position is often engaged as the status of an undertaking in sporting associations. As an 
example, clubs participating in the same league might be considered collectively dominant 
concerning Article 102, as understood by the pertinent case law.233 Trade between Member 
States will usually be affected due to the scope of application of the provisions implemented 
by international sporting organisations. Provisions of domestic sports associations normally 
affect just the territory of their particular country but according with the high level of 
internationalisation and free movement in professional sport, those provisions might too 
disturb trade amid the different Member States. The same could be stated in relation to the 
agreements between clubs associated to domestic and international federations.  
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5.1. Establishing the Relevant Market 
Firstly, the relevant market must be described from its product, geographic and, if 
appropriate, temporal market.234 In describing the product market, cross-elasticity of demand 
is examined in order to conclude the degree to which the goods or services provided are 
substitutable for other commodities or services from the consumer’s perspective.235 The 
extent of substitutability (or ‘interchangeability’) is centred upon a putative SSNIP236 test that 
questions whether the undertaking’s consumers would shift to prepared existing alternatives 
or suppliers, in reply to a minor but important non-transitory increase in price (5–10%) in the 
goods or services, with diferrent areas being studied. In case the level of change resulted in 
loss of trades and made the cost increase unprofitable, extra alternatives and areas are 
incorporated in the relevant market until the range of goods and geographic areas is such that 
relative prices’ increases would turn lucrative.237 From the supply side, defining the product 
market, cross-elasticity is quantified regarding the option for suppliers to change production 
to the relevant product (in reaction to its relative price rise) and retail it in the short period 
deprived of suffering substantial extra costs.  
The wider the concept of the relevant product market, the less probable that the issue 
of dominance will be discovered. The undertakings facing inquiry will therefore always 
attempt to involve as many other suppliers and products into the concept as workable. In 
controlling the geographic market, simply the Member States in which the circumstances of 
trade are suitably standardised for the market to be deemed in its whole are considered and, in 
reverse, those Member States markets where different contexts of competition exist are 
exempted from the concept. The concept of relevant market is also significant in the cases 
regarding Article 101(1) when reflecting whether an agreement has a restrictive effect or 
distorts competition. 
Articles 101 and 102 have a mutual feature that is, inter alia, a necessity to delimit the 
relevant market from both the product market and the geographic positions. Following the 
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usually recognised Stix-Hackl and Egger categorisation, three types can constitute the 
relevant product market for professional sport.238  
The primary regards exploitation market in which federations and clubs exploit their 
accomplishments and commercial rights, for example, through sales of matchday revenue, 
broadcasting rights, merchandising and so forth. Following the exploitation market, the author 
recognises the contest market in which the final outcome - the sporting competition - is 
cooperatively shaped by the clubs, with athletes being the most significant element of 
production.239 In order to successfully implement a competition, sporting governing bodies 
draft the provisions that control competition among contenders and provisions restraining 
entrance to competitions. Once in European football the competitions are open and they 
operate the promotion and relegation system, the market cannot be exactly distinguished 
according to leagues. The third type is the supply market that fundamentally encompasses the 
purchasing and selling of athletes by the teams. Interchangebility is commonly quite little in 
the primary two types of markets however it is likewise little when it occurs to the top athletes 
in the supply market. Furthermore, some experts in economics have prepared a valuable 
explanation of the organisation of sporting competition that differentiates concerning the 
product market, the labour market, and the capital market.240 The product market in a sporting 
tournament encompasses structure of competition (playing provisions for the competition and 
its organisation), league structure (organisation and configuration of the league), and income.  
The configuration of a labour market in a sporting tournament includes: player 
assignment to clubs, player fee and salary determination along with the size of the player 
inventory. The capital market configuration in a sporting tournament deals with the forms of 
ownership agreements. One absent aspect in this taxonomy is governance, i.e., the method 
that provisions and strategies are decided, and the extent of vertical incorporation.241 In Piau 
case law, the provisions of the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations concerning to agent 
licensing criteria were contested on the grounds of Articles 101 and 102. The relevant market 
was considered to be ‘the market affected by the rules in question’, i.e., ‘a market for the 
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provision of services where the buyers are players and clubs and the sellers are agents’.242 In 
ENIC243, the EC assessed the provision that forbidden ownership of several football clubs, 
regarding to which two or more teams joining in the same UEFA tournament cannot be 
straight or implicitly controlled by the same power or managed by the same individual. The 
ENIC possessed interests in six professional football clubs. It claimed that the relevant market 
is the one for capital financing in teams in Europe that is ‘characterised on the demand side by 
football clubs seeking capital and/or investment and on the supply side by individuals or 
corporations interested in investing in a European football club. Football clubs are competing 
in this market for access to capital’.244 Curiously, the relevant market definition, according to 
the CAS was, in this case245, deemed to be ‘the market for ownership interests in football 
clubs capable of taking part in UEFA competitions’.246  
What was understood as the supply side by CAS was identified as the demand side of 
the market by ENIC and vice versa. On the supply side of the relevant market, following 
CAS, are the probable vendors of ownership stakes in football clubs.247 Furthermore to the 
concept of the relevant market, ENIC also interpreted vis-à-vis the markets: for athletes, 
sponsorship, merchandising, media rights market and the market for gate receipts as the 
secondary markets.248 The UEFA ‘home and away’ ruling in Lille/UEFA249, in which each 
team must play its domestic matches at its own stadium, was disputed under Article 102 by 
the French Communauté Urbaine de Lille. Later, UEFA denied permitting the Belgian team 
(Excelsior Mouscron) to play its home game versus other French team (Metz) in Lille. The 
EC pondered that Lille was operating in the market for the renting of facilities, but it did not 
resolve the issue of whether UEFA was dominant in the market for controlling European 
football club tournaments.250 
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In 1998 Football World Cup the EC scrutinised the application of discriminatory 
matchday ticket sales deals by the local organising committee of the 1998 Football World 
Cup in France regarding non-French domiciled residents. The concrete outcome of such 
discrimination was to block the tremendous majority of customers outside the country 
admission to a substantial proportion of tickets for the decisive games. The relevant product 
market was drafted based on a descriptive assessment in the SSNIP test, and it was stated to 
cover just the market for the entry tickets for Football World Cup 1998 because of the small 
cross–elasticity of the demand side.251 The relevant geographic market was assumed to 
encompass ‘at least all countries within the EEA’.252 
To sum up, the relevant market in terms of CL&FFP regulations are firstly 
professional football clubs since their financial monitoring is what UEFA is trying to fix with 
the regulations253 and, secondly, professional football players. One should notice that if a club 
cannot purchase one professional athlete that it desires at the value it is willing to hire, it 
pursues another who fulfils its standards. It is unreasonable to define the substitutability on 
such circumstances because, contrasting identical features that arise from several factories, 
each player is unique.254 
5.2.  Does the implementation of the CL&FFP regulations by UEFA constitute 
a Decision, an Agreement of an Undertaking or an Association of Undertakings? 
As the EC stated beforehand that UEFA joins directly in economic practices255 and the 
Accompanying Document to White Paper on Sport added that ‘organisational sporting rules 
(…) that determine the conditions for (…) clubs’ to involve in sporting activity as an 
economic undertaking, are subject to scrutiny under the antitrust provisions of the Treaty256, it 
seems coherent to assume that UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations constitute an economy activity 
and, following, they should be evaluated under EU legislation because, as every new legal 
framework instrument, CL&FFP regulations has been exposed so some criticism. 
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Subsequently, it is required to reflect whether UEFA is categorised precisely as an 
undertaking by itself or as an association of them. Possibly, UEFA might be categorised as 
both, concerning the exact activity that is being questioned – e.g., FIFA, the international 
upper governing body of world football industry, has been categorised as either on diverse 
occasions. FIFA was classified as a standalone undertaking when entering into agreements for 
broadcasting privileges, in one Commission ruling.257 
In Piau v Commission of the European Communities, nevertheless, the Court 
categorised FIFA as an association of undertakings when a dispute arose regarding their 
player rules.258 The rationale behind this was that FIFA was constituted of national 
confederations that are composed of undertakings themselves - clubs. Through applying the 
CL&FFP regulations, UEFA is working in an analogous method to FIFA legislating player 
guidelines. Consequently, in an environment of a legal dispute to these rules, a court would 
possibly keep Piau’s reasoning and determine that UEFA is an association of undertakings. A 
disagreement to this assumption is that UEFA and its associates truly comprise a ‘group 
economic unit’. If UEFA and its associates were categorised as a ‘group economic unit’ then 
they are not in conditions of contracting259 or emanating a decision. Fruitlessly, in the U.S., 
the NFL used this counter-argument in contradiction of an accusation that their exclusive 
contract with Reebok breached the Sherman Act.260 Nonetheless, the CJEU has understood 
this term far more restrictively than in the U.S. Under EU law, a ‘group economic unit’ only 
contemplates wholly owned subsidiaries that follow the directions of their parent, and do not 
have real autonomy to choose how to perform in the market.261 UEFA is not included in this 
classification, and therefore competition law would concern to them as an association of 
undertakings.  
Ultimately, the CL&FFP regulations would fall under both the concepts of an 
agreement or a decision. Either these definitions have been given a wide interpretation by the 
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judges.262 In addition, the apparent environment of sporting rules and commercial contracts 
turn them easy to fall under these concepts.263 Simon Gardiner and others have provided 
guidance on determining the eventual classification of sporting regulations: 
In case of the direct outcome of an arrangement between the body and, for instance, 
professional teams, tournament managers and individual athletes, that would be probable to 
be deemed as an agreement; while if the ruling were ratified by a sports federation under 
power conceded to it by its associates, then this would likely be characterised as a decision of 
an association of undertakings. 
The EC has established in a previous judgment that the supra UEFA’s provisions was 
an emanation of UEFA since the UEFA Executive Committee drafted it.264 The UEFA 
Executive Committee also approved the CL&FFP rules, and they were implemented under 
power granted by its associates. Accordingly, the enactment of these rules would be deemed 
as a UEFA’s decision265 as CL&FFP appears to be a horizontal agreement between providers 
of sports services – clubs, which comprises obligations to control spending – vis-à-vis 
players’ salaries while it is also supported by vertical restraints - licensing criteria – enforced 
by the upper governing body.266 
5.3. Will the trade between Member States be affected by CL&FFP regulations? 
In order to fall under Article 101(1) TFEU, an agreement between undertakings may 
also ‘affect trade between the Member States’.267 The decision in 1996 case law, Société 
Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, clearly presented this element when the CJEU held 
that:  
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‘It must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a 
set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, 
direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between member states’268. 
 
At first glance, it is controversial that services related to football industry are 
somewhat that is transacted between member states. Trade is stated widely, and it is not 
restricted to simple production and supplier relations, but comprises all abroad economic 
activity.269 AG Lenz’s opinion in Case URBSFA v Bosman indicated that football athletes 
running among Member States, determines trade270. In addition, within the E.U, football 
athletes are frequently dealt across several different leagues in several   states. Therefore, 
soccer-playing services are merchandised within member states. Moreover, it is probable that 
the CL&FFP rules will touch this inter-state business. As the BE prerequisite in the guidelines 
has a salary cap tendency, football clubs must respect a stipulated threshold consigned on 
their budget expenses.  
Consequently, there will probably exist cases where a team cannot proceed with a 
deal, as the increased cost would provoke a violation of the BE clause. The NBA offers 
guidance that a salary cap mechanism restricts athletes trade. There, numerous prearranged 
deals have flopped because of their deficient space under a clubs’ salary cap.271 Analogous 
circumstances are probable to occur under the CL&FFP rules, and therefore they are possible 
to undertake an effect on the hypothetical configuration of trade among the different member 
states. 
Last but not least, this essential factor demands that the influence on trade must be 
appreciable.272 A significant element regarding this examination is the market place of the 
undertakings affected.273 The EC held a rebuttable presumption concerning agreements that 
will not substantially influence trade.274 This occurs where the market position of the 
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pertinent parties within the society is fewer than 5%, and business flow of those ones is less 
than €40m275. 
UEFA seem to run as a real monopoly when administrating the functioning of 
European professional soccer, having a far larger market share than the stated one. 
Additionally, most clubs will adhere to these provisions, as already mentioned before and, 
therefore, it is probable that the effect on inter-state business would be appreciable. 
5.4. Do the CL&FFP object or effect pursue the restriction of competition? 
Within this topic, the meanings ‘object or effect’ should be considered alternative, 
instead of being interpreted as cumulative requirements.276 While considering this factor, the 
leading pace to do is to reflect whether the object of the agreement is a foe of competition. 
Once this is proved, it is useless to continue to scrutinise the influence of the agreement.277 
Article 101(1) TFEU determines examples of agreements that are liable to restrict 
competition, in order to help the interpretation of this element.  
They encompass: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts.278  
Concerning the object study, when defining whether the CL&FFP rules have the 
‘object’ of damaging competition, a court will inspect the objective inference and the aim of 
the arrangement regarding the economic environment in which it will be involved.279 It 
should be reminded that one of the major aims of the CL&FFP issued by UEFA is to reduce 
impact on salaries and transfer fees and restrict inflationary outcome. UEFA drafted the BE 
rule for achieving this goal of placing a limit on the amount each team is able to spend on 
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athletes wages. This aim, joint with the use of the BE provision, presents the CL&FFP rules 
the look of a price fixing business. Price fixing is one of the exemples of an anticompetitive 
effect enshrined in Article 101(1)(a) TFEU280 and is frequently considered as partaking the 
object of restricting competition.281 European courts have stated price fixing comprises 
whichever dealing that directly or indirectly limits price competition.282 They are perceived as 
‘hardcore restrictions’ and they did not benefit from the safe-harbours.283 The CL&FFP rules 
seem to fall under this meaning once the limit on spending in the BE provision can be 
understood as a maximum amount instrument that restricts the capability of teams to compete 
for athletes on cost basis.  
Moreover, other academics have claimed that salary caps ‘by its very nature has the 
object of distorting and restricting competition’.284 Consequently, as the provisions seem to 
work as a price fixing procedure, and they have the explicit purpose of lessening pressure on 
players’ wages, they seem to encompass an anti-competitive object. Indeed, there are who 
consider that price fixing arrangements suppress price competition more than the CL&FFP 
regulations (e.g. if clubs approved to a ‘player salary cap’ then a club would not be able to 
strive for a player on value beyond the capped level.  
Nevertheless, under the CL&FFP regulations, the limit is not as strict and there is 
possibility for a club to transfer other players to allow them to make a better proposal.285 
Sometimes, in some doubtful judgements of price fixing, a court will determine that an 
agreement does not comprise an anti-competitive object, and in its place leans on the anti-
competitive effect of the dealing.286 
In assessing the effect study, it is necessary to determine what panorama would exist 
deprived of the CL&FFP regulations, and balance this to the state of affairs since the 
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implementation of the mechanism.287 Prominently for the CL&FFP regulations, this element 
can be met based on probable anticompetitive effects, notwithstanding the anti-competitive 
effects are still to arise.288 Therefore, a court might still determine that the CL&FFP 
regulations breach Article 101(1), albeit the precise effect of the regulations may remain 
unclear. Economic studies concerning ‘relative’ salary caps analogous to the CL&FFP 
regulations advocates that these kind of caps do decrease overall salary expenditure and thus 
partake an anticompetitive effect.289 For example, if the CL&FFP regulations had been 
enacted in the EPL for the 2009/2010 season, wage to turnover ratios would have dropped by 
as much as 15%.290 Positively, there are some signals that football clubs are altering their 
conduct in reaction to the implementation of the CL&FFP regulations. Consequently, 
although a court did not acknowledge that the object of CL&FFP is to be a foe competition, 
the effect of it evidently makes just that. 
Moreover, the CL&FFP regulations might comprise the anticompetitive effect of 
restraining investment. 
There is no necessity to show its adverse effects on competition, when the anti-
competitive object of the agreement is recognised. The spirit of law of this article is very wide 
once no actual and direct effect on trade is compulsory and prima facie any prepared 
arrangement could fall under this clause. 
5.4.1 De minimis doctrine and CL&FFP regulations 
As mentioned above, the regulations held a cap on how much money through equity 
injections from wealthy owners or related parties can be considered for the purpose of BE 
rule. Accordingly, the provisions have an impact on the amount of money that some 
participants are able to put into a club. It should be added that there are some exemptions 
within the scope of this rule.291 
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Initially, these statutory concessions are mainly for those agreements that have an 
impact on competition, by effect.292 Some of them are considered inoffensive and 
consequently cannot be assessed under Article 101(1) of the TFEU since they do not pursue 
an ‘appreciable impact’ on trade among Member States.293 However, to qualify these 
restrictions in light of Article 101(1) TFEU, they need to comply with another prerequisite.  
The de minimis doctrine has been developed by the courts to stop them having to 
undertake with decisions or agreements that are of quite trivial significance.294  
The doctrine stipulates that an agreement or decision will deem to fall outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) except if its effect on competition or interstate business flow is 
‘appreciable’.295 Using another terminology, an agreement that has a quite minor impact on 
the market will not violate Article 101(1). The EC has issued regulation on the de minimis 
doctrine to assist consider when somewhat falls under Article 101(1).296 This suggests that a 
decision is not deemed irrelevant where the parties implicated collectively have 10% (or 
more) of the relevant market.297 While these instructions are useful, this investigation should 
not be guided in a merely quantitative approach. There might appear cases where the market 
share of undertakings is less than the latter, however the effect on trade is still deemed 
appreciable,298 and the reverse as well.299 
The EC updated the previous de minimis communication provided in 2001 for two 
principal motives. Primary, it required modernisation towards the progresses in the case law 
and specifically the CJEU’s ruling in the Expedia decision. Therefore, the CJEU enlightened 
that ‘anticompetitive agreements by object cannot be considered as minor, because they have 
by definition an appreciable impact on competition. As a result, such agreements cannot 
benefit from a safe harbour’.300 The necessity to harmonise the scope of the Notice with other 
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EU antitrust provisions implemented after 2001, was another motive for the revision of the 
2001 De Minimis Notice. The updated Notice guarantees full alignment with, particularly, the 
Vertical and Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations, providing further clarity to 
stakeholders.301 EC’s knowledge with the enforcement of the de minimis doctrine Notice in 
2001 has been very positive and the several stakeholders supported this. Consequently, the 
methodology and the provisions hold in that Notice is preserved, with little novelties. 
Following, agreements that have as their object an impact on competition, vis-à-vis the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Single Market, do not fall under 
the Notice's safe-harbours. 302 
Moreover, unlike the Commission’s Notice which listed specific ‘by object’ or 
‘hardcore’ restrictions that did not benefit from the safe harbours, the 2014 Notice held that 
the EC will not provide the ‘safe harbours’ to agreements encompassing any restriction ‘by 
object’ or any of the restrictions that are registered as "hardcore restrictions" in existing or 
upcoming Commission block exemption regulations. It is explained, in that framework, that 
‘hardcore restrictions’ are deemed to usually establish restrictions by object, according to the 
Commission. Last but not least, the 2014 Notice no longer encompasses clarifications on 
"effect on trade" since in 2004; the EC provided detailed instructions on this matter, as 
already seen beforehand303. 
The first restriction on competition resulting from the limitation on expenditure is 
liable to affect competition in an appreciable way. Following the above rationale, UEFA held 
a dominant position in their marketplace and they do not comply with the 10% comfort zone. 
In addition, the rules are prospective to touch a majority of teams304 and this, combined with 
the statistic the majority of clubs are probable to try to obey with the provisions, indicates that 
the impact on competition will be appreciable.  
Nevertheless, the restriction of competition done by restraining financing can be a 
distinctive situation. Although UEFA possess a dominant market stake, this constraint may 
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only have a minor impact. The rules just constraint backers who are injecting money just to 
provide the finances that the club needs. Financial backers can still provide in other sectors 
such as club facilities or youth development systems, as already seen before. Also, this limit 
of financing perhaps does not operate to a broad range of individuals. The ‘acceptable 
deviation’ rule originally permits for €30m of money by equity owners. Therefore, the only 
persons touched will be those who are expecting to bankroll a club’s remuneration 
expenditure on a big dimension. This will not have a great impact on the general sporting 
industry, given this is simply probable to influence a small number of financiers, and there are 
numerous in the sporting market.305  
Consequently, if this was the single competition constraint, it might not be sufficient 
to hold a dispute under Article 101(1) TFEU. Ipso modo, the supra analysis proposes that 
UEFA CL&FFP mechanism comprise a decision of an association of undertakings which 
have the effect of appreciably restricting competition and thus encompass a breach of Article 
101(1) TFEU306. 
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Part III. General Conclusions and Outline od the Possible Justifications
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1. Outline of the possible justifications 
Regarding the purpose of this piece of research, it will now be analysed if any 
justifications can be applied into the CL&FFP regulations in order to avert a statement that 
they are void.307  
The main purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise whether either the statutory 
concession enshrined in Article 101(3) of the TFEU or the judicially drafted Wouters 
exception, apply to the CL&FFP regulations. The UEFA regulations will not infringe Article 
101(1) if either of these exceptions applies. Following, it seems coherent to illustrate the main 
disparities amid these two statutory concessions. The so-called Wouters exception permits to 
compare non-competition aims against impacts in competition, and determine that the first 
overrule the second.308 Furthermore, it can be argued that the provisions are not deemed to 
have an impact on competition incompatible with the common market, even if they would 
otherwise restrict it.309 When this happens, there is no breach of Article 101(1) TFEU since 
the final element - whether the agreement has the object or effect of restricting competition - 
is not fulfilled. 
In addition to the Wouters judicially drafted exception, we find Article 101(3) of the 
TFEU, which is a competition legal exception. The trust of Article 101(3) is considering and 
matching the pro and anti-competitive impacts of the behaviour at stake, and concluding 
whether it is cost-effectively advantageous to consent the behaviour, notwithstanding its anti-
competitive effects.310  Where behaviours like an agreement, a decision or a concerted 
practice fulfils the criteria of Article 101(3), that Article stipulates that the agreement or 
decision in issue might be exempted from Article 101(1). 
2. The Wouters exception 
In Wouters Case, the CJEU initiated its judicially created exemption, considered by 
Wish as a ‘regulatory ancillarity’311 and by Monti as a ‘European-style rule of reason’.312 The 
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decision does not actually represent the full picture regarding Article 101(1) legal framework, 
since the assessment of the positive and anti-competitive outcomes of restrictions comprises 
economic altercations on both sides. Instead, Wouters presents the evaluation of the EU’s 
competition law aims versus the non-economic public interests that might, or not, be deemed 
as a part of the EU’s goals in other fields.313 The Wouters test was confirmed in the sporting 
case of Meca-Medina.314 
In relation to the justification of anti-competitive agreements under Article 101 TFEU, 
the CJEU in Wouters adopted a procedure that is rather similar to the Gebhard test.315 In that 
case, the CJEU found that an anti-competitive agreement does not fall under the prohibition 
laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU when it is necessary to achieve a legitimate objectives316 
and ‘whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit oh 
those objectives and are proportionate to them’.317 
Therefore, following Meca-Medina and its predecessor Wouters, we are left with a 
significant number of problems in applying it to the CL&FFP - predominantly as regards the 
contentious BE requirement and the TPO ban - in order that it may establish itself as not 
contravening Article 101 TFEU, and therefore not constituting an illegal restriction on 
competition.318 In addition, it should be analysed whether the CL&FFP pursue legitimate 
objectives, if the restrictions imposed are inherent to pursue the final goal of financial 
sustainability within European football clubs and if the provision are proportionate to 
accomplish it.319  
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2.1 The legitimate objectives of CL&FFP regulations 
The key objetive of UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations is to guarantee the longstanding 
financial sustainability within the European football industry. It is fitting to scrutinise the 
framework around the implementation of the mechanism in order to define whether this 
comprise a legitimate objective.320 UEFA introduced the FFP regulations due to concern over 
the financial behaviour of football clubs.  
As before mentioned in the introduction of this piece of research, in 2011, a significant 
number of clubs competing in the European top football divisions were making losses and 
recording negative equity year after year. However, even in the perspective of dangerous 
financial performance, some might claim that the purpose of financial sustainability is not a 
legitimate objective. In common dealing, companies would have autonomy and sovereignty to 
administer their own financial activities, even if they were running affairs in a dangerous way. 
The rationale behinds this is that it is not the function of a governing body to prevent an 
enterprise from jeopardizing itself. However, this argument appears inconsistent since it does 
not take into account the special characteristics inherent to sporting activities and disregards 
the fact that European football clubs are distinctly perceived from other business industries.321 
Moreover, the CJEU ruling in Meca-Medina advocates that sporting rules’ legitimate 
objectives are generally attached to the “organisational and proper conduct of competitive 
sport’.322 This framework might support UEFA’s position when claiming that in order for the 
organisation of a sports competition to run efficiently, it is necessary to ensure that a football 
club competes the entire season.323  
Furthermore, following Van Maren and others reasoning, it should also be noticed that 
the total top division club losses were found to be €1.1 billion in 2012, which corresponds to 
an 8% loss margin. In spite of the clubs still made losses, the final result ‘is €600m less 
compared to the €1.7bn in 2011’.324 The balance between club assets and liabilities has also 
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improved considerably, with club net assets increasing by 50% over the first three years of 
FFP-BE provisions while the club net debt has decreased by more than €1bn.325 The CL&FFP 
system has stimulated owner financing in assets.326 Club balance sheet net assets have 
increased in the last three years with FFP encouraging owner investments - club balance sheet 
assets now exceed all debts and liabilities by €4.9bn.327 UEFA Head of CL&FFP, Andrea 
Traverso, annouced that ‘for the first time, Europe's clubs are individually ranked in a series 
of top-20 lists, covering TV money, gate receipts, UEFA prize money, wages, other operating 
costs, underlying operating and 'bottom-line' net profitability, stadium assets, squad costs and 
transfer incomes and spend’.328 
Additionally, the EC appears to reinforce the objectives behind CL&FFP. The 
Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Sport and the UEFA Joint Statement with 
the European Commission on the CL&FFP regulation seems to reinforce this objective, as 
already stated. Consequently, in this author’s opinion, a court will determine that the 
CL&FFP regulations pursue a legitimate aim when trying to achieve the long-term financial 
sustainability of European football clubs.  
2.2 The CL&FFP regulations indispensable restrictions 
Regarding this issue, the court must determine whether the anti-competitive impact on 
the amount that a club is able to expend in a player’s salary is inherent in attaining the 
purpose of long-term financial sustainability within the European football industry. The 
Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Sport offers regulation on this. Nevertheless, 
the restriction here at stake is not as elementary as determining that the provision limiting 
each half to 45 minutes and a game to 90 minutes is ‘inherent in the organisation and proper 
conduct of competitive sport’.329  
In Meca-Medina, the CJEU determined that the impact on competition of the anti-
doping sanctions were ‘inherent for the proper conduct of competitive sport and the healthy 
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rivalry of athletes’.330 Analogously, the EC established that the prohibitive clause on the 
‘ownership of two or more sports clubs that were competing in the same UEFA competition 
was inherent for ensuring the uncertainty of results’.331  
It seems clear that if the main objective is to achieve long-term financial sustainability 
of European football clubs, in an industry characterized by dangerous financial practices, then 
reasonably there will require to exist restrictions targeted on the financial behaviour of 
European football clubs. This assumption does not seem to be any further polemic then 
stating that anti-doping sanctions are required to guarantee that rivalry among competitors is 
impartial.  
A mechanism that might actually monitors the clubs’ finances without capping the 
amount that a club is willing to pay, could be another possible approach to the matter. 
Nonetheless, as is added following in this piece of research, these alternative solutions are not 
satisfactory to pursue financial sustainability objective.332  
Accordingly, a court would probably determine that the restrictions on expenditure 
side in the CL&FFP regulations are inherent in attaining the main purpose of accomplishing 
financial sustainability within the European football industry. 
2.3 The proportionality of CL&FFP regulations 
The last phase of the Wouters exception encompasses an analysis of the 
proportionality principle policy, within EU law.333 
The EC, in its White Paper on Sport stipulates that ‘the sporting rule must also be 
proportionate in relation to its objective in order for it not to infringe Articles 101(1) and 102 
TFEU and must be applied in a transparent, objective and non-discriminatory manner’.334 
This also comprises a binding legal framework for the scrutiny of sporting policies regarding 
domestic market rules. The issue, at this point of the research, is to determine whether there 
are any other possible - and less limiting – procedures, which are skilful for attaining the 
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equal purposes. Therefore, any suggested alternative procedure need to fulfil with the 
principle of proportionality, thereby representing a valid less restrictive mean, contrasting to 
merely representing a conceivable alternative, in order for the CL&FFP regulations to be 
deemed disproportionate in EU law.  
Currently, the principle is enshrined in EU law, and can form the basis to challenge 
EU policies, and Member State exercises that falls under its scope of application. The 
proportionality assessment comprehends three prerequisites that must be complied as for the 
restriction to be deemed defensible. Primary, the action must be an effective approach of 
achieving the identified purpose (suitability test).335 Additional, the action must be necessary 
for attaining the purpose, comprising that no alternative and less restrictive means are capable 
of attaining the purpose (necessity test).336 Ultimately, the limitation enforced cannot be 
greater than necessary to attain the purpose (proportionality test, stricto sensu).337 With this 
being said, one must conclude that the greater the restriction’s impact on the market, the 
greater the efficiencies must be. How rigorously the court will scrutinise those factors is so 
important as the principle of proportionality prerequisites.338 The rigor of the proportionality 
analysis differs upon the circumstances of the issue at stake, once it is evaluated on a case-by-
case legal perspective.339  
The court may adopt an interpretation that is based on a lot of deference to the 
decision maker (UEFA, in this case), or alternatively, make a "rigorous examination and 
search" of the reasoning behind the thing being challenged.340 For a court to determine the 
appropriate intensity, two important factors must be considered. Indeed, the nature and 
importance of the objective to be achieved, and the nature and importance of the interest 
raised by the applicant should be assessed. 
Furthermore, a court will also consider the ‘relative expertise, position, and overall 
competence of the court as against the decision-making authority in assessing those 
factors’.341 The CL&FFP regulations do not seem to involve the need of a strict 
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proportionality inquiry. Usually, this is needed where an action breaches an imperative right 
or community interest (e.g. a fundamental civil liberty of a person). The CL&FFP regulations 
simply overstep the ability to perform in a relevant market deprived of competitive 
restrictions.342 However, EU law also oversteps this reasoning, and an Article of the Treaty 
specifically allows this, in specific contexts – Article 101(3). 
In addition, the legitimate objective of the CL&FFP is not one that requests a 
considerable amount of deference to the governing body.343 Following, the CL&FFP 
regulations appearently do not involve any area of public interest, as the stated supra. 
Therefore, neither of the objectives involved with the regulations undoubtedly encompasse 
the right intensity of a proportionality test.  
Nevertheless, there are other good reasons that suggest a court should not undertake a 
rigorous examination of the CL&FFP regulations. UEFA might claim that regarding the 
specificity of sport, and UEFA’s know-how in the matter, a court would turn to be quite 
reluctant in interfering with the upper governing body of European football. Moreover, as we 
have already seen in the beginning of Chpater II, Stephen Weatherill proposes that the 
previous judicial decisions in this subject expresses a legacy of courts demonstrating sceptical 
to meddle with the actions of sporting bodies.344 Thus, confidently UEFA has better skills to 
establish what is the best conduct for the industry than any court. Likewise, UEFA might 
claim that the judicial body should not comprise a intensive test of proportionality, as the 
involved parties actively contributed in writing the provision and, through this talks, it is 
perceveid that these parties could receive several benefits.345 It should also be reminded that 
the majority of the stakeholders in European football reinforced the position of UEFA 
Executive Committee, when the latter approved the regulations.  
It seems difficult to precise the rigorousness of a proportionality test that a court might 
pursue.  Again, Courts and experts on the field have already provided many superficially 
distinctive criteria of the proportionality test, depending on a case-by-case analysis. With the 
consultation process that took place above, this author deem to consider that a court will be 
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very reluctant in determining that the UEFA financial fair play mechanism is 
disproportionate. 
2.3.1 Suitability test 
In order to assess if a measure is adequate and appropriate to achieve its desired 
objectives a test, which looks at the relationship between the means and ends of the measure, 
is necessary. As stated above in this piece of research, there are studies and evidence that 
provide and indication that the CL&FFP regulations will be successful in decreasing expenses 
for European football clubs. Therefore, this is strictly linked to the main legitimate purpose of 
CL&FFP regulations, which is attaining a long-term financial sustainability within European 
football clubs.   
Some protesters could indicate the court decision in the Case Fedesa and Others v 
Council of the European Communities, in order to prove the regulations’ unsuitability.346 In 
this case the applicants claimed that the method at stake was a fruitless and unsuitable 
measure because it was unmanageable to apply in practice, and it would result in the 
formation of a risky black market. An analogous aspect might be taken against the CL&FFP 
regulations. Football clubs are continuously looking for loopholes in the provisions, turning 
them very hard to operate.  Despite these gaps in the law that let transpire some difficulties, in 
this author’s opinion, it does not represent an argument that seems to have enough weight to 
be deemed 'unsuitable' by a court. 
Football clubs will always seek loopholes in any regulations that UEFA operates. 
Only if those loopholes are so widespread as to leave the regulations generally impracticable, 
a court is likely to rule that the CL&FFP regulations are suitable to attain their purpose. 
2.3.2 Necessity test 
The vital question here lies on assessing whether the method is ‘necessary’, i.e. 
whether there are other less restrictive means available that are competent in attaining the 
same objectives.347 The subsequent considerations will briefly introduce several possible 
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substitutes – luxury tax; solvency mechanism; addressing overinvestment - to the CL&FFP 
regulations and provide how a court is expected to handle them. 
A luxury tax purposes to obstruct excessive level of expenditure by taxing wage costs 
over a pre-determined limited value. It differs from a salary cap that stipulates an absolute 
level clubs must not exceed.348 Another alternative could be the introduction of a simple 
solvency mechanism that European football clubs must comply. Such mechanism would 
comprehend, amid other things, complex criteria for clubs to comply with certain capital and 
liquidity levels to guarantee that the sporting industry is capable of subsisting through 
dissimilar economic contexts, like is operated in the banking sector.349  
However, the devices proposed so far focus on attaining financial sustainability by 
implementing new financial regulation approaches on football clubs. However, a better device 
could be drafted by aiming on fixing behaviour, not monitoring it. The CL&FFP regulations 
are grounded on the principle that teams are overspending, thus, addressing investment in a 
different manner and scrutinising what instigates these teams to pursue such behaviour may 
provide the response.  
It is improbable a court would deem these as a suitable alternative to the CL&FFP 
regulations since there does not appear to be enough proofs to determine they would fulfill 
UEFA’s aim of long-term financial sustainability. Again, this would be a very drastic 
approach for a court to rule out the current CL&FFP regulations, given UEFA know-how in 
the field.  
2.3.3 Proportionality/(stricto sensu) test 
This analysis encompasses determining that the CL&FFP regulations might comprise 
the least restrictive means accessible to attain the purpose of financial sustainability, but 
inquiries whether these restrictive mean comprehends a disproportionate impact on the 
claimant's interests.350 This inquiry will target the financial expenses the claimant will suffer 
because of the enforcement of the mechanism, and these impacts will be balanced against the 
aim that is pursued.351  
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There are those who consider that the hazard in the European football industry is not 
relevant enough to justify the implementation of the applicant’s approach. For example, in 
Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Communities, the claimants opposed the 
proportionality of a ruling that removed the approval for the use of particular additives in 
some products.352 The CJEU decided that, notwithstanding its hesitation as to whether there is 
a strict link between the use of those antibiotics as additives and the development of 
resistance to them in humans, the prohibition on the feeding stuffs is not a disproportionate 
measure when compared with the aim pursued, vis-à-vis the defence of human health.353 
 In a parallel manner, one could argue that the danger of bankruptcy is not relevant, 
and in that sense the restriction on the applicant's concerns is disproportionate. This reasoning 
relies on the fact that notwithstanding European clubs seeming to have financial difficulties, 
they hardly breakdown due to them.354 The precise financial harm that may effect would 
differ on who the applicant was. If it were an athlete, the argument may be grounded on the 
effect the regulations have on their wage. Otherwise, a football team could argue that due to 
the restraints they are no longer capable to act as fine as before the measure, and as a 
consequence have experienced a decrease in incomes.  
Nevertheless, it seems improbable a court will revert the CL&FFP regulations based 
on this arguments. A court would also be reluctant to rule out UEFA’s interests given its 
know-how in establishing what is advantageous for European football. In addition, a wage 
reduction for a player or thin decrease in income for clubs is improbable to be so 
disproportionate in this case to require a courts involvement. Ultimately, at this phase of the 
proportionality inquiry, a court will previously have ruled the procedure both necessary and 
suitable. Consequently, while they will still ponder this supra prerequisite, by now the 
chances may be set against the applicant.355  
Following the supra study, one should determine that the CL&FFP regulations will 
meet the Wouters exception. The rules seek to attain a legitimate purpose, specifically long-
term financial sustainability. Besides, the restraints rising from the CL&FFP rules appear to 
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be inherent in the pursuit of that purpose as well as proportionate to it. Thus, the Wouters 
exemption determines that the UEFA mechanism do not restrict competition in breach of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. This piece of research will now reflect whether the Article 101(3) 
concession in the TFEU would also be fulfilled. 
3. A closer look to Article 101(3) TFEU 
The European football upper governing body, UEFA, might also pursue protection 
under Article 101(3) TFEU, which stipulates a concession to a breach of Article 101(1) 
TFEU. Article 101(3), in its important statements, writes that the provision in quesion is 
‘inapplicable’ when the anticompetitive procedure at issue ‘contributes to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit (…)’.356 Additionally, the behavior 
must not ‘impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives’ or ‘afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question’.357  
If an agreement or a behaviour that breaches Article 101(1) TFEU complies with these 
conditions, then it ‘shall not be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required’.358 
These agreements ‘are valid and enforceable from the moment that the conditions of (Article 
101(3) of the Treaty) are satisfied and for as long as that remains the case’.359 According to 
the EC’s interpretation, this Article 101(3) TFEU criteria amount to an evaluation of pro and 
anticompetitive effects, and only the four conditions enforced by the provision are 
considered.360 Each prerequisite will be separately scrutinised here to conclude whether 
UEFA's CL&FFP regulations would qualify for this defence.  
We must also note that likewise the test established by the CJEU in Wouters, an 
anticompetitive decision can be justified – and it is possible for the CL&FFP regulations to be 
exempt from the anti-competitive violation of article 101(1) TFEU - if it fulfils the conditions 
set in TFEU Article 101(3). This provision contains four cumulative criteria that must be 
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fulfilled, with the first two demanding an affirmative answer and the former two a negative 
one. 
The EC’s interpretation in this provision is very rigorously and there are insufficient 
block exemptions for particular situations. Correspondingly, four conditions need to be 
achieved, when these do not operate: efficiency gains; fair share for consumers; 
indispensability of the restrictions; no elimination of competition.361 These criteria are 
cumulative and all need to be consequently met for an exemption to be applicale. As 
mentioned before, the exclusion only operates to measures improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Moreover, article 101(3) requires that the 
measures shall be ‘indispensable to the attainment of these objectives’, meaning that the 
restraints are essential.362 Finally, the decision must not afford such undertakings the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question.  
The EC has provided guidance on how to operate these conditions and they will then 
be scrutinised in this piece of research.  
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3.1 Efficiency Gains 
In order to be considered as an efficiency gain, the ‘restrictive agreement must 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress. The provision refers expressly only to goods, but applies by analogy to 
services’.363 Additionally, each efficiency entitlement must require: (i.) The nature of the 
alleged efficiencies; (ii.) The bond between the agreement and the efficiencies; (iii.) The 
probability and impact of each claimed efficiency; and (iv.) How and when each alleged 
efficiency would be attained.364 
UEFA would claim that the essence of the efficiency achieved in this context is the 
financial sustainability of European football.365 The CL&FFP regulations precisely provide 
what football clubs can and cannot do financially, and they also provide clubs inducements to 
invest in the youth development sectors and related long-term investments that can assist a 
club in preserving its financial power in a long-term perspective. This durability is definitely 
an efficiency that can support the financial growth of European football, at least on theory. 
The bond amid this efficiency and the CL&FFP rules is concise and straight to the point. The 
regulations have been drafted with the legitimate objective of making sure that clubs subsist 
economically. The probability of the efficiency is reasonably high since the rules have already 
blocked many teams from expending as much as typical and they have a convincing 
inducement to comply so that they may join in UEFA's competitions.366 
The impact is also expected to be widespread as the regulations operate to all 
European clubs who have qualified for a UEFA club competition and as several national 
leagues adopted the same approach, as an UEFA’s extension.367 The agenda for attaining the 
efficiency is visibly held in monitoring periods in the CL&FFP rules, and the purpose is to 
carry European clubs to financial prosperity within a certain period of time (or to enforce 
sanctions). It is expected that, notwithstanding some financial limitations be engaged on the 
clubs, the CL&FFP regulations will lead to ensure financial improvement once all teams will 
be more economically accountable and that the sport will flourish in a long-term perspective.  
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For now, it looks coherent to assume that the CL&FFP regulations encompass 
efficiency but time will tell if this will really materialise. 
3.2 Fair Share to Consumers 
The CL&FFP regulations should also be advantageous to consumers.368 In this case, 
they comprise ‘all direct or indirect users of the products covered by the agreement (…)’.369 If 
the CL&FFP regulations provide these consumers in a better situation than they would be 
without them, then this prerequisite is satisfied.370 This is considered regarding the ‘overall 
impact on consumers of the products within the relevant market and not the impact on 
individual members of this group of consumers’.371 The goods here at stake can be several 
(vis-à-vis clubs for the players, players and supporters for the clubs, football for the 
supporters and sponsorship agreements for the backers). 
Challengers of the UEFA’s mechanism will argue that the CL&FFP regulations will 
harm the competitive balance within football leagues.372 Therefore, it is questionable that this 
will diminish the value of the competition from a consumer’s perception and economic 
research is needed to define the precise impact a reduction in competitive balance would 
provoke on European football industry. If this analysis suggested that a reduction in 
competitive balance decreases consumer interest in European football, this would be a 
disadvantage resulting from application of UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations.373  
Again, determining whether this prerequisite is fulfilled seems problematic when 
considering the existing evidence. Nevertheless, it ought to be mentioned that the party 
pursuing to trust on Article 101(1) TFEU - UEFA - is the one that must provide that 
consumers gain countervailing advantages.374 
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3.3 Indispensability test 
A two-part examination needs to be applied in order to determine if the restrictions are 
indispensable: ‘First, the restrictive agreement as such must be reasonably necessary in order 
to achieve the efficiencies. Secondly, the individual restrictions of competition that flow from 
the agreement must also be reasonably necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies’.375  
Some analysts claim that UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations are not advisably needed to 
prevent football clubs from accumulating losses. They argue that there are other options, 
already tested in other professional sports, which could work within UEFA.376 For example, 
they suggest that by letting behind the transfer window system - the time period in which 
players’ transfers can be arranged – the exaggerated salaries and financial pressure problems 
would be mitigated.377   
This analysis demands a parallel inquiry to the proportionality test under the Wouters 
exception.378 Conversely, the Wouters exception scrutinised substitute measures for attaining 
the same legitimate purpose of financial sustainability. The possible benefits resulting from 
the UEFA’s mechanism are a rise in product value due to upgraded financial sustainability in 
European football industry. Therefore, there is a straight connection amid these efficiencies 
and the legitimate purpose of the provisions.  
Consequently, if there are no feasible and less restrictive means of achieving financial 
stability, as already concluded in this piece of research, the CL&FFP regulations are 
considered indispensable. 
3.4 No eliminatition of competition 
This prerequisite establishes that while a measure encompasses pro-competitive gains, 
it cannot be at the sacrifice of the competitive process.379 The evaluation ‘requires a realistic 
analysis of the various sources of competition in the market, the level of competitive 
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constraint that they impose on the parties to the agreement and the impact of the agreement on 
this competitive constraint’.380 
The likelihood of eradicating competition is substantial in this case. Teams from 
minor markets frequently possess smaller infrastructures and less income.381 With the 
regulations in force, today the teams with better facilities, bigger sponsorships deals, and 
more supporters will make more income and will, consequently, have a considerable benefit 
concerning what they are able to expend. These intrinsic benefits are not properly 
anticompetitive. Instead, what eliminates competition is that the CL&FFP regulations 
preclude clubs with less income from spending anything beyond their revenue in order to 
purchase a bigger market share and invite more profit. It was already predictable that clubs 
with rich backers, who had previously spent loads of money before the regulations were 
applied, would support them. They apparently have no interest in seeing their contender’s 
improving their sporting performance. The CL&FFP regulations fundamentally fasten clubs 
into their present standards of viability since they cannot expend more than their means to 
have more success at different levels.382 This comprises the likelihood of eradicating many 
teams from some day being capable to rightfully fight with the most powerful ones for the top 
performers and between other on the pitch.  
Moreover, even if an owner wants to invest in the club’s infrastructure (e.g. a new 
stadium) for more income, merely the finance expenses of building a stadium can be set aside 
of the calculation of relevant expenses under the BE requirement enshrined in CL&FFP 
rules.383 They need to ‘have been expensed in a reporting period rather than capitalised as part 
of the cost’.384 Nevertheless, even if they were capable of constructing an infrastructure 
within these limitations, they will still demand a team that general public is interested in 
watching compete.  
 Although UEFA states that the CL&FFP regulations are intended to support sporting 
competition, it appears probable that it will just fasten every club into its present status with 
small margin to advance or to move back because of limitations on expenditure. Also, due to 
the reach of the mechanism and thus regarding the volume of participants in UEFA targeted, 
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the CL&FFP regulations do seem to eradicate competition ‘in respect of a substantial part of 
the products concerned’.  
Following this interpretation, it is this author’s view, the CL&FFP regulations do not 
fulfil the criteria to boost the exception enshrined in Article 101(3) TFEU.  
  100 
4. A mention of Article 102 TFEU 
Article 102 sets a prohibition regarding abuse of market power, in one or more 
relevant markets, by undertakings in a dominant position that can be pursued by one 
undertaking (single dominance) or more (collective dominance). The reasoning of this rule is 
not to prohibit the purchase and existence of dominance per se, but is targeted at monitoring 
the unilateral conduct of a dominant undertaking(s) with market power. Ipso modo, three 
related questions must be conducted, in principle, when regulating the presence of an abuse of 
the dominant position.385 
Primarily speaking, the relevant market should be defined, as already mentioned 
before386, from its product, geographic and, if appropriate, temporal market.387 The 
delimitation of relevant market concept is also significant in the cases related to Article 
101(1) when reflecting whether an agreement takes a restrictive or distortive effect on 
competition. Secondly, the relevant market explanation will be useful in order to assess 
whether a firm(s) was dominant within that market. The definition of a dominant position is 
stated as a position of economic power owned by an undertaking that enables it to inhibit 
effective competition and being sustained on the relevant market by providing it the power to 
act to a considerable degree, regardless of its competitors and consumers.388 Market power is 
determined under a market share basis detained by the undertaking,389 the presence of 
possible contenders, barriers to entry, grade of vertical integration, specificity of the 
merchandise in subject, and other elements of dominance.390 The presence of a dominant 
position arises from a combination of some of these aspects which, taken individually, are not 
necessarily convincing.391 Firm(s) in a dominant position partake a special duty not to permit 
their behaviour to impair authentic and undistorted competition.392 
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 In its verdict in Piau case, the CJEU wrote about the problem of collective dominance 
in the sporting industry. Revisiting the previous decision in Compagnie Maritime Belge393, it 
addressed that legally autonomous economic entities might be established collectively 
dominant ‘provided that from an economic point of view they present themselves or act 
together on a particular market as a collective entity’.394 Subsequently, the Court reiterated the 
three cumulative prerequisites for a judgement of collective dominance as presented in the 
Airtours decision.395 
Enactment by the teams of a ruling such as the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations was 
perceived as resultant in teams being so connected - as to their behaviour - on a specific 
market, that they are current on that market as a collective body their participants, their 
dealing partners, and customers.396 FIFA, national football bodies, and the team composing 
them were considered collectively dominant on the market for providing players’ agents’ 
service industries. Since the rules are mandatory for national associations that are associates 
of FIFA and the teams composing them, these associations seem to be connected in the long 
term as to their behaviour by policies that they consent and that other undertakings (namely 
players and players’ agents) cannot breach in risk of penalties that may contribute to their 
preclusion from the market, particularly in players’ agents cases and such a condition 
consequently typifies ‘a collective dominant position for clubs on the market for the provision 
of players’ agents’ services, since, through the rules to which they adhere, the clubs lay down 
the conditions under which the services in question are provided’.397 
FIFA is involved albeit it is not operating on the market for players’ agents’ services; 
it is enough that it comprises the willingness of the national associations and the clubs, the 
real economic operatives on the relevant market. FIFA acts on the market through its 
associates. The factor of abuse of the collective dominant position was not consequently 
proved in this judgement. It was not the primary assessment in which the question of 
collective dominance was addressed in the sporting area: in the Bosman case, Advocate 
General Lenz deemed that football clubs in a professional competition might be ‘united by 
such economic links’ as to be considered as collectively dominant.398 Nevertheless, the CJEU 
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decided this dispute under the domestic market rules and then absent to stipulate supervision 
on the competition issues. 
The third and ultimate question relates to the factor of abuse of the dominant position 
in the specified market. Illustrations of abuse are set in Article 102 TFEU in a non-extensive 
list. Unlike merely unilateral abuses (e.g. as predatory pricing), contractual abuses comprise 
implicit or explicit involvement of another undertaking (e.g. in exclusive supply agreements). 
Resembling Article 101(1), the component of effect on trade amid Member States is 
mandatory for abusive conduct to be deemed contrary to Article 102.399 Refusal to supply is a 
wide notion and considers many practices with vertical and horizontal embargos, and denial 
to contract with current and new consumers.400 More precisely, it considers practices refusal 
to grant access to so-called essential facilities401, refusal to supply to prevent parallel trade402, 
or like refusal to supply in the aftermarket403, refusal to supply with the purpose of excluding 
a competitor from an ancillary market.404 
In particular contexts it is conceivable to file a single action as an anticompetitive 
decision (under de aegis of Article 101 TFEU) and, at the same time, an abuse of a dominant 
position (in behalf of Article 102 TFEU).405 The pyramidal structure of sport within the EU 
exposures the provisions and decisions of sporting bodies like UEFA to be challenged on the 
basis that they establish an abuse of dominant position.406 In Europe, as the upper governing 
body of professional football, UEFA can perform deprived of competition concerns and 
consequently has a dominant position in the football marketplace.407 It does not seem, 
nevertheless, as if UEFA abused that position when implementing the CL&FFP regulations. 
The TFEU does not encompass a clear concept of what comprises abuse, but it is usual to 
                                                 
399
 See Commission Notice— Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, 
pp. 81–96. The same examination for effects on trade is enforced as in Article 101(1). 
400
 Communication from the Commission— Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, paras 75–90.  
401
 Cf. Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press, Fourth edition, 2011, pp. 
486-487. 
402
 Cases C-468-478/06 Sot. Lelos kai Sia and others EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton [2008] ECR I-7139.  
403
 Case 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister v. Commission [1979] E.C.R. 1869: even where the offending undertaking is not dominant in the primary 
product market but only in the market for its own spare parts. 
404
 Cases 6 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission [1974] E.C.R. 223. 
405
 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen & Silver Line Reisebtiro GmbH v. Zentrale zur Beksmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V., 1989 
E.C.R. 803, para. 37. 
406
 Cf. Case T-193/02, Piau v. Commission of the European Communities, 2005, E.C.R. 11-209, para.107-116 (stating that a dominant 
position is characterized by the market provision for players' agents' service and the rules to which they adhere). 
407
 Case 85/76, Hoffimann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, paras. 38-39. 
   103 
differentiate among three distinctive sorts of abusive conduct: exploitive abuse that 
jeopardises customers, exclusionary abuse that damages players, and reprisal abuse that 
penalises another stakeholder for its practices.408 
The CL&FFP regulations do not fall under any of the standards of abuse written in the 
TFEU nor do they fit either classification.409 Resembling rules that require clubs 
compensation from old clubs' training expenditures upon signing free agents, salary caps just 
harm athletes, not contenders or customers, and they do not fit into the group of people 
covered by Article 102 TFEU.410 
4.1 Application of both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
Conferring to settle case law, the two competition rules can be simultaneously 
enforced.411 Previously in its early decision on Continental Can, the CJEU provided that 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU pursue to accomplish the same purpose of preserving effective 
competition within the common market.412 In several cases, the policy of the dominant 
undertaking(s) fits on the strengthening of their market power by contractual clauses means - 
as tying, exclusivity – and so forth.  
The arrangements between two or more undertakings covering such clauses may 
produce or strengthen a situation of dominance that is, or may become, element to abuse. 
Such arrangements can be contrary with both, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. If the situation 
comprises an implicit collusion in an oligopolistic market then just Article 102 operates, and 
if the collusion is obvious than Article 101 will operate simultaneously. The behaviour rising 
from the positions of restrictive arrangements between the undertakings comprising a single 
economic entity is deemed autonomous and not collusive so Article 102 only will be relevant, 
but just if the firm(s) affected are dominant on the relevant market. Regularity held that 
Article 101(3) should be understood as excluding any use of this exception to restrictive 
agreements that form an abuse of a dominant position. Instead, an enterprise, which holds a 
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dominant position, might benefit from an exception under Article 101(3) TFEU when its 
criteria are met.413  
In decisions in the sporting context like in the Piau case, the CJEU considered that if 
the behaviour of a dominant company fulfils all the criteria of Article 101(3) such behaviour 
should not be deemed as an abuse under Article 102 TFEU.414  
One should argue that the requisite of dominance is the single distinction concerning 
Articles 101 and 102 when it regards to vertical contractual restraints comprising a dominant 
undertaking. Consequently, as the present separation of workforces between Articles 101 and 
102, it is challenging to support from a legal and economic analysis, the suggestion that 
leaving Article 102 and trusting solely on Article 101 would be a reasonable resolution, which 
would create many pros, while encompassing an actual reform of Article 102 without carrying 
out explicit disagreement with existing standards.415 
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5. Conclusions 
Every well performing football club becomes rapidly expensive, but not every costly 
team performs well. This takes us to the subject of this thesis - financial sustainability - what 
is indeed not only one, but the key success factor for professional football competitions – and, 
therefore, it is the crucial element of UEFA’s Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play 
regulations. Through this research, we study that, all over the world, most of clubs’ 
executives tend to operate imprudently and tend to overvalue their chances in the 
competitions. This may result in disproportionate expenditure relative to the income some 
clubs generate, as delays in honoring debts occur frequently in many leagues. Consequently, 
club financial practices have somehow to be monitored and it is recommended, in order to 
achieve this, an adequate licensing system and financial fair play regulations.  
My purpose, with this paper, is to outline the strong link between financial health as a 
key factor of success of a competition and a strict and elaborate licensing system, constantly 
subject to continuous improvement. Some may continue arguing that enforcing UEFA’s 
concept would simply mean that smaller teams are unable to catch up the most powerful 
clubs, but it does not seem consistent. Better management tools or ideas will always help 
clubs to compensate for less ability in other areas. But the fair play concept encompasses that 
nobody can buy success only through his ‘deep pockets’. Only if the club’s financial 
performance - which precisely reflects the drawing potential of a club and thus its 
achievements - is strictly regulated, and these respective rules are interpreted as a purely 
sporting rule, what they really are, the leagues and other governing bodies like UEFA can 
control the immense cash injections and heavy borrowing which brought all the problems and 
financial difficulties to the industry. The assumptions and equations are made, but are not 
properly implemented and their enforcement is a chore. 
This thesis aims at defining whether UEFA’s CL&FFP regulations would contravene 
European competition law. Despite the provisions evidently restricting competition, this paper 
illustrates that they attain a legitimate goal that no other less restrictive measures could 
possibly achieve. Following, the answer is that, probably, the regulations issued by UEFA do 
not breach EU law. The first chapter refers to the rationale behind CL&FFP regulations, why 
UEFA wanted to implement them, and introduces their legal framework. Chapter Two 
analyses whether the CL&FFP regulations can be challegend under EU law when introduced 
the ‘salary cap’ and the ‘third-party ownership’ concepts. After studying that, it analysed 
whether the regulations are apparent in breach of the elements of Article 45 and, mainly, of 
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Article 101(1) of the Treaty. It is concluded that UEFA constitutes an association of 
undertakings and that the CL&FFP rules comprise a decision of that association. In addition, 
it is concluded that the CL&FFP regulations will affect trade between member states in an 
apprecible way. It is also assessed whether they possibly comprise a restriction of competition 
as their object and, even if a court did not rule that this was their main objective, the CL&FFP 
mechanism would have the effect of restricting competition. The final chapter encompasses 
the legal analysis by outlining whether there are any possible justifications that would 
preclude the infringment of Article 101(1). The Wouters exception would most probably be 
activated and found the restriction of competition held in Chapter Two to be compatible with 
the market. This is because that restriction of competition complies with every criteria set in 
the judicially created exemption. This chapter also presents that a legal dispute under Article 
102 TFEU would not be fruitful, as UEFA did not constitute an abuse of dominant position 
when enforced the mechanism. 
To conclude, this research establishes that the CL&FFP regulations are welcome, but, 
inevitably, the ultimate verdict lies with the judicial procedure. Nevertheless, there are other 
factors that might preclude the assessment of the provisions as the contractual bound between 
the European football upper governing body - UEFA - and its members; the predetermined 
duty to arbitrate at the clear ban of appeal to the European courts; the tacit and explicit 
agreement of the members under UEFA’s control and the support vindicated by the EC. 
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